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Article 3

THE ALBRECHT RULE AFTER KHAN: DEATH
BECOMES HER
Roger D. Blair*
John E. Lopatka**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1968, the Supreme Court made a mistake. It held in Albrecht v.
Herald Co.' that an agreement between a supplier and its dealer setting the maximum price the dealer will charge for the supplier's products is a per se violation of the antitrust laws. The decision was at odds
with the purpose of the law, for maximum resale price fixing benefits
consumers by preventing dealers from exploiting market power. Suppliers do not adopt the practice out of benevolence for consumers, of
course. They profit from it. This is one of those happy economic
instances in which the interests of suppliers and consumers are
aligned, and are opposed to the interests of dealers. The Court
should have sat back and allowed the market to work. The decision to
intervene was a testament to the confusion attending the Court's perception of antitrust goals during that era, as well as to the Court's
failure to appreciate the economic function of the practice.
Twenty-nine years later, the Court corrected its mistake. In State
Oil Co. v. Khan,2 the Court repudiated Albrecht, holding that vertical
maximum price fixing is not illegal per se. Antitrust doctrine had
evolved significantly during the interim. The Court had, for example,
revised its approach to nonprice distributional restraints, holding that
they are no longer illegal per se. 3 Albrecht became an anachronism.
Khan reflects both a sharpened focus on what the law is about and an
increased level of economic sophistication. In particular, scholars had
* Huber Hurst Professor of Business and Legal Studies, Department of
Economics, University of Florida.
** Alumni Professor of Law, University of South Carolina. We thank Don Dewey,
Andy Kleit, and Bill Page for thoughtful comments on a prior draft of this article.

1 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
2
3

118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).
See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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bombarded Albrecht relentlessly, and the Court decided the time had
come to strike the flag. Better late than never.
Albrecht was an insidious case. Not only did it force suppliers to
devise costly alternatives to vertical maximum price fixing that served
the same purpose, it weakened the antitrust injury doctrine. That
doctrine requires a private plaintiff to demonstrate an injury related
to the inefficiency caused by an unlawful practice. Maximum resale
price agreements are not anticompetitive, and so both lower courts
and the Supreme Court struggled to reconcile the substantive Albrecht
rule with the doctrine of antitrust injury. Their attempts never fully
succeeded, and the antitrust injury doctrine became less coherent as a
result. By overruling Albrecht, the Court freed the doctrine from the
stress of an inconsistent substantive rule.
Khan, however, is not a complete success. The Court pointedly
refused to hold that maximum vertical price fixing is legal per se, deciding instead that it is subject to the rule of reason. Applying the rule
of reason to a practice seems innocuous enough, even enlightened.
Who could object to condemning a practice when it has unreasonable
effects? But the Court offers no guidance on how to conduct an inquiry into the reasonableness of the practice, and if maximum resale
price agreements predictably have no anticompetitive effects, the inquiry is a waste of effort. Worse, because courts are fallible, welfareincreasing instances of the practice can be deterred. Besides, the possibility of illegality-however remote-means that the tension between the substantive rule and the antitrust injury doctrine is not
wholly resolved.
In the next section, we trace the doctrinal history of the Albrecht
rule. We then describe the Khan decision. In Part IV, we offer an
economic analysis of vertical maximum price fixing, addressing in
turn the function of the practice and the possibility that it could be
used by a supplier to exploit monopsony power. We discuss the implications of Khan in Part V, highlighting the strengths and weaknesses
of the opinion and concluding that it does not presage a sea change
in other antitrust doctrines. A brief conclusion follows.
II.
A.

EVOLUTION OF THE

DoCRINE

Albrecht and Its Foundation

In Khan, the Court repudiated the rule that maximum resale
price restrictions imposed by a supplier on its distributors through
some kind of an agreement is illegal per se. That rule was laid down
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in Albrecht,4 where a newspaper publisher sold its papers to independent, home-delivery carriers, who were expected to resell them at prices
no higher than those advertised by the defendant publisher. Carriers
were given routes that were exclusive as long as they adhered to the
suggested maximum resale prices, which the publisher advertised as
being available to subscribers. Albrecht, the plaintiff carrier, complied with the price ceiling for a time, but when he raised his prices,
the publisher complained to him, offered to sell papers directly to his
customers at the lower, suggested resale prices, and hired a solicitor to
offer those customers direct home delivery. It also gave Albrecht's
route to another carrier on a temporary basis, informing him that he
would lose the route if his prices exceeded the specified maximum or
perhaps ifAlbrecht conformed to the price cap. Albrecht lost customers as a result and sued the publisher under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act.5 Over stinging dissents by Justices Harlan and Stewart, the Court
6
held that Albrecht was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
One significant aspect of Albrecht is the Court's analysis of agreement for Section I purposes. Relying upon United States v. Parke,Davis
& Co.,7 the Court had no trouble concluding that a combination existed between the publisher, the solicitor, and the replacement carrier.8 The Court opined, moreover, that Albrecht could have
successfully asserted a combination between the publisher and himself, at least as of the day he unwillingly complied with the suggested
price, and one between the publisher and other carriers who followed
the pricing guideline. 9 The Court even suggested that Albrecht might
have successfully alleged a combination between the publisher and
Albrecht's customers. 10 For present purposes, what is interesting
about this analysis is that, according to the Court, the agreement necessary to condemn a vertical maximum price restraint under Section 1
need not take place between the supplier and a dealer whose pricing
decisions are constrained. Even the agreement between the publisher
4 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
6 For an economic analysis consistent with the views ofJustices Harlan and Stewart, see Roger D. Blair & David L. Kaserman, The Albrecht Rule and Consumer Welfare:
An Economic Analysis, 33 FiA. L. R-v. 461 (1981).
7 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (holding that a manufacturer combines with its wholesalers
when it announces suggested retail prices and refuses to sell to wholesalers who sell to
non-complying retailers and that it combines with retailers when it takes steps to persuade retailers to comply with the suggested prices).
8 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 149-50.
9 See id. at 150 n.6.
10 See id.
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and the solicitor, for example, would have triggered the application of
Section 1.
Our primary concern, however, is the second aspect of the opinion-that a vertical maximum price restraint is per se illegal. The
Court alluded to several, perhaps four, economic effects of such a restraint in support of its conclusion: (1) maximum resale price restraints may "severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete"
by limiting the dealers' pricing freedom;" (2) the resale price "may
be fixed too low" for the dealer to provide all of the services for which
consumers are willing to pay; 12 (3) maximum resale price fixing "may
channel distribution through a few large or specifically advantaged
dealers who otherwise would be subject to significant nonprice competition;" 13 and (4) if dealers nearly always charge the fixed maximum
price, "the scheme tends to acquire all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices. '14 The Court went on to reject the defense that the price restraint was justified because the publisher had
conferred exclusive distribution territories on its carriers, so that a
price cap was necessary to prevent the carriers from exploiting their
monopoly power.' 5 The Court was skeptical that the vertical territo11 Id. at 152. The Court cited this consequence first, and its observation in full
was that "schemes to fix maximum prices, by substituting the perhaps erroneous judgment of a seller for the forces of the competitive market, may severely intrude upon
the ability of buyers to compete and survive in that market." Id. The best interpretation of this passage is that the Court did not intend to describe a separate, adverse
economic effect of the practice at issue, but rather to summarize the detailed effects
that follow. Implicitly, the Court seemed to so construe the passage in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 336-37 (1990), where the Court did not
allude to this asserted consequence in a list of the adverse effects identified in Albrecht.
But in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S.Ct. 275, 282 (1997), the Supreme Court treated the
adverse impact on "dealer freedom" as a separate purported justification, so for clarity
we do so here.
The passage does highlight an ambiguity in the Albrecht Court's analysis. Thus,
the Court might have been suggesting that consumer welfare is the sole purpose of
the antitrust laws and that restraining dealers is significant only because it may affect
the interests of consumers. Or the Court might have intended to imply that protecting dealers is an independent purpose of the antitrust laws. See infra notes 87-89 and
accompanying text. The fact that the Court counts channeling sales through large
dealers as an adverse effect of the practice lends some support for the latter interpretation, for the suggestion seems to imply that the antitrust laws are offended when a
supplier acts to confine distribution to the most efficient dealers when other, smaller
dealers, though not consumers, are injured as a result. Protecting inefficient dealers
obviously comes at the expense of consumers who consequently pay higher prices.
12 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53.
13 Id. at 153.
14 Id.
15 See id.
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rial restrictions were valid and concluded that, if an otherwise illegal
price restraint is necessary to blunt the "pernicious consequences" of
16
the nonprice restraint, the whole scheme is illegal.
We explain below that the effects specified by the Court do not
support condemnation of vertical maximum resale price fixing, much
less per se condemnation. 17 Here, however, we are interested in exploring the precedential basis for the Court's economically curious
conclusion. One might have expected the Court to rely on Dr. Miles
Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co.,' 8 where the Court had held that
vertical minimum resale price fixing is illegal per se. After all, the
Court reasoned that a vertical maximum resale price agreement is anticompetitive in part because it may "acquire all the attributes of an
arrangement fixing minimum prices,"'19 and citing at that point the
seminal case condemning the referenced practice seems natural. In
addition, vertical minimum and maximum price fixing bear some superficial resemblance. Yet the Court never mentioned the case, and
the likely reason is that, in responding to Justice Harlan, the Court.
was forced to repudiate the logic of Dr.Miles. The Court in that case
condemned vertical minimum price restraints partly on the ground
that their effects are indistinguishable from those of horizontal price
fixing by dealers, which is clearly "injurious to the public interest" and
therefore illegal. 20 In other words, "the advantage of established retail
16 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 154. Justice Harlan countered that exclusive territories
'are neither always unlawful nor have they been demonstrated to be unlawful in this
case." Id at 166 (Harlan, J., dissenting). He argued that "rough territorial exclusivity" was likely efficient given the cost characteristics of newspaper distribution. Id.
(Harlan, J., dissenting). He apparently thought that, as a result, either a single dealer
would have a monopoly in a given territory and would price as a monopolist. Or "a
relatively small number of competing distributors" would serve a given area, and they
would price legally though non-competitively as oligopolists. I& at 166-67 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). (Whether Justice Harlan's prediction about the behavior of oligopolists comports with economic theory is a separate matter. See generallyJohn E.
Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Ty, 41 AmNrRusT BULL. 843 (1996)
(surveying various theories). Either way, the publisher's imposition of maximum resale price restrictions served the interest of "the public" and was therefore lawful. See
Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 165 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Similarly, Justice Stewart reasoned
that the granting of exclusive territories "was a perfectly permissible practice" and that
the maximum resale price restriction was therefore lawful because it protected
"householders. . . from the petitioner's monopoly position." I&.at 168-69 (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
17 See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
18 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
19 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 153.
20 Dr. Miles. 220 U.S. at 408.
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prices primarily concerns the dealers," not the manufacturer.2 1 Justice Harlan argued in Albrecht that, whereas vertical minimum price
fixing serves the interests of dealers, vertical maximum price fixing
benefits the supplier and consumers. 2 2 In response, the Court offered
a rather eloquent recitation of the special services theory of resale
price maintenance, explaining that vertical minimum price fixing may
indeed benefit a manufacturer and consumers by inducing the provision of point-of-sale services by dealers.23 Of course, it is a mystery why
the Court would then list as an anticompetitive effect of vertical maximum price fixing that it might acquire the attributes of resale price
maintenance. More mysteriously, Justice Harlan endorsed the logic of
Dr. Miles without citing the case.
Instead of pointing to Dr. Miles, the Court cited four other cases
for the proposition that "resale price fixing is a per se violation of the
law."'24 Two of them, United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. 25 and United
States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 26 involved conventional horizontal
price fixing, the essence of which is an agreement among competitors
to raise the price they charge for a product. Consumers are injured
because the price is above and the quantity below the levels that would
prevail under competition among suppliers. Neither involved resale
price fixing. Another, United States v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc.,2 7 con21 Id. at 407.
22 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 157-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23 See id. at 151 n.7. The special services theory is usually attributed to Lester
Telser, though the Court did not cite his article. See Lester G. Telser, Why Should
ManufacturersWant Fair Trade?, 3J.L. & ECON. 86 (1960). For example, Richard Posner has remarked that the special "service argument... originated in Telser." Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution:Per Se
Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 n.26 (1981). But the essence of the theory was expounded earlier by Ward Bowman in an article the Court did cite: Ward S. Bowman,
Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. CHI. L. REV. 825,
840-43 (1955), cited in Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 151 n.7. Indeed, Benjamin Klein and
Kevin Murphy point to similar reasoning in much earlier articles: T. H. Silcock, Some
Problems of PriceMaintenance,48 ECON. J. 42 (1938); F. W. Taussig, Price Maintenance,6
AM. ECON. REV., March 1916, at 170. See Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, Vertical
Restraints as ContractEnforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265 n.1 (1988).
24 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added).
25 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (holding that an agreement among firms with market
power in the supply of vitreous pottery fixtures to fix prices of sanitary pottery is
illegal).
26 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (holding that an agreement among competing oil companies to raise the price of gasoline was illegal per se).
27 351 U.S. 305 (1956) (holding that an agreement between a wholesaler-who
also manufactured and sold drugs to other wholesalers-and independent wholesalers to fix the minimum price at which the independent wholesalers could resell the
product violated Section 1 and was not protected by the fair trade laws).
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cerned the validity under the Miller-Tydings Act 28 and the McGuire
Act 29 of what amounted to minimum resale price fixing.3 0 This practice can serve a number of efficiency-enhancing functions, 3 1 one of
which the Court described in Albrecht. Alternatively, when used on an
industry-wide basis, it can facilitate horizontal price fixing at either the
supplier or dealer level.3 2 In any event, neither horizQntal collusion
to fix the price of products sold nor resale price maintenance has the
same economic effects as maximum vertical price fixing.
Only the fourth case, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. JosephE. Seagram & Sons,
Inc.,33 involved maximum resale price fixing; indeed, Justice Harlan
noted that Kiefer-Stewartwas "the only case in this Court in which maximum resale prices have actually been held unlawful." 34 The Court in
fact relied principally on Kiefer-Stewart, declaring that the case "was
''3
correctly decided and we adhere to it.
5 That case involved an agree-

ment between what the Court viewed as competing liquor distillers to
impose maximum resale prices on their wholesalers.3 6 Justice Harlan
insisted that the horizontal aspect of the arrangement was critical to
the Court's decision.3 7 The Court there did say that "an agreement
among competitors to fix maximum resale prices" violates the Sherman
Act.38 It also observed that either of the distillers "acting individually
perhaps might have refused to deal" with wholesalers, suggesting that
28

Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (codified as

amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1995)).
29 McGuire Act of 1952, ch. 745, 66 Stat. 632 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1995)).
30 These two laws shielded from federal antitrust attack resale price maintenance
arrangements that were adopted pursuant to state fair trade laws. Congress repealed
this protection in 1975. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act, Pub. L. No. 94-145, 89 Stat.
801 (1975) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1995) (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 45)).
31 For recent surveys, see Roger D. Blair &James M. Fesmire, Communications:The
Resale PriceMaintenancePolicyDilemma, 60 S. EcoN.J. 1043 (1994); Pauline M. Ippolito,
Resale PriceMaintenance:EmpiricalEvidencefrom Litigation, 34J.L. & ECON. 263 (1991);
Howard P. Marvel, The Resale PriceMaintenance Controversy: Beyond the Conventional Wsdoam, 63 ANrrrusr L.J. 59 (1994). A recent contribution is David A. Butz, Vertical Price
Controls with UncertainDemand, 40 J.L. & EcON. 433 (1997).
32 See generally Telser, supra note 23, at 104; Ippolito, supra note 31, at 281-82.
33 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
34 Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 164 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35 Id.at 152.
36 The manufacturers were affiliated, and they would not have been treated as
separate entities capable of conspiring after Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube
Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) (holding that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned
subsidiary constitute a single economic actor for purposes of Section 1). But at the
time of Kiefer-Stewart, the agreement between the affiliated companies selling competing products was treated as a horizontal combination.
37 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 164 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
38 Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 213 (emphasis added).
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unilateral imposition of a resale price cap might similarly have been
permitted.3 9 Though Justice Harlan did not use the term "monopsony," he reasoned in effect that an agreement among manufacturers
may represent the creation of monopsony power in the "purchase" of
distribution services from dealers. The "price" that manufacturers pay
for distribution is the difference between their wholesale prices and
the resale prices; by capping resale prices and setting wholesale prices,
manufacturers squeeze the dealers' profit margin and depress the
price they pay for distribution below a competitive level. 40 Collusion
among buyers is thus the mirror image of collusion among sellers, and
like the latter is illegal per se. 4 1 He did not pursue the analysis further, but Justice Harlan might have argued that, by contrast, if a single
buyer of distribution services has monopsony power, a vertical maximum price restraint, though perhaps an agreement, represents only
the exploitation of that power, not its creation. The mere refusal to
pay more than a monopsony price cannot be deemed unlawful anymore than can the mere refusal to charge less than a monopoly price.
At the very least, the Supreme Court has never held that the pure
exploitation of market power by a monopsonist, whatever the product, violates the antitrust laws.
If this is what the Kiefer-Stewart Court meant, it might have cited
Swift & Co. v. United States,42 where the Court condemned a conspir43
acy among buyers not to bid against each other at livestock auctions,
an arrangement that "compell[ed] the owners of such stock to sell at
less [sic] prices than they would receive if the bidding really was competitive."44 Or it might have cited Mandeville IslandFarms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co.,45 where the Court condemned an agreement
among sugar refineries that had the effect of lowering the price they
paid farmers for sugar beets. It cited neither. Instead, it cited only
Socony-Vacuum. 46 That case did involve a combination among competitors, giving some credence to the argument that the Kiefer-Stewart
39 Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
40 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 164-65; see also Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358,
1361 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997). We analyze this concern below and
reject it as a likely explanation for maximum price restraints. See infra notes 172-86
and accompanying text.
41 This proposition had been established at the time of Albrecht (see, e.g., Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219 (1948)), butJustice Harlan cited no authority.
42 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
43 See id. at 400.
44 Id. at 391 (emphasis added).
45 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
46 See Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 213.
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Court meant only to condemn horizontal agreements to impose maximum resale price restraints. And the Socony-Vacuum Court did make
the now-famous declaration: "Under the Sherman Act a combination
formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se."' 47 But the reference to depressing
prices in this passage is dicta, for the combination in that case had the
effect of raising prices. 48 Still, failure to cite the most appropriate
precedents does not mean that the Kiefer-Stewart Court was primarily
concerned about something other than the creation of monopsony
power. The Court might have considered the pithy, relatively recent
dicta perfectly adequate. Besides, the Socony-Vacuum Court did cite
Swift.

49

The majority dismissed Justice Harlan's reading of Kiefer-Stewart,
commenting that it was "scarcely derivable from the opinion in that
case."5 0 Yet that opinion, running a mere five pages, does not contain
much analysis of any kind. If Justice Harlan's reading was "scarcely
derivable," so was the majority's contrary reading. Perhaps the best
argument the Albrecht Court could have made is that Kiefer-Stewart did
not depend on the horizontal agreement, but on the defendants' contention that their agreement was legally justified because it con5
strained the prices of wholesalers, who had conspired to raise prices. '
The Court acknowledged that the distillers had introduced evidence
of a wholesalers' cartel, but it rejected the defense.5 2 One might argue that, just as high retail prices brought about by a downstream
price fixing conspiracy do not justify a maximum resale constraint imposed from above, high retail prices resulting from exclusive distributorships do not justify a vertical maximum price constraint, whether
one upstream firm imposes it or several competing upstream firms
agree to impose it.
In the end, the basis of Kiefer-Stewart is infirm, and so the support
it lent Albrecht was shaky. If Kiefer-Stewart was intended to outlaw combinations among competitors to acquire and exploit monopsony
47 Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 223 (emphasis added).
48 The Court noted that the arrangement condemned in Socony-Vacuum had the
effect of creating a "floor," which kept prices higher than they might have been. Id-at
223.

49 See id. at 222.
50 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152 n.8.
51 See Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 214.
52 The Court concluded: "The alleged illegal conduct of petitioner... could not
legalize the unlawful combination by respondents nor immunize them against liability
to those they injured." IM.
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power, that intent was not explicit. Under such a reading of the case,
the arrangement in Albrecht was not illicit, both because it did not involve a horizontal agreement and because the newspaper publisher
had no apparent monopsony power in the purchase of distribution
services. 53 But the problem with this interpretation of Kiefer-Stewart is
that the liquor distillers that entered into the agreement to impose a
resale price cap in that case had no monopsony power. They were not
attempting to depress the price of distribution below the competitive
level, but to prevent distributors from raising the price of liquor to a
supracompetitive level. Holding the defendants liable in Kiefer-Stewart
then makes sense only if the benefits of a per se rule prohibiting all
horizontal agreements to fix maximum resale prices outweigh its
costs. To reach that conclusion, one would have to believe that these
agreements typically represent the acquisition and exploitation of monopsony power rather than a device to increase efficiency, such as by
restraining a downstream cartel.
Had the Albrecht Court looked below for guidance, it would not
have found much. In Quinn v. Mobil Oil Co.,5 4 the First Circuit had
held that, where a gasoline supplier terminated a dealer because he
would not reduce his retail price to that suggested by the manufacturer, the dealer could not recover against his supplier under Section
1 for want of an agreement. In a concurring opinion, which Justice
Harlan cited, Judge Coffin went further, concluding that even an
agreement between a single manufacturer and its dealers as to maximum resale prices passes antitrust muster. 5 5 Judge Coffin reasoned
much like Justice Harlan after him, though in distinguishing KieferStewart he did not suggest that the key was the creation of monopsony
power. 56 Judge Aldrich in dissent would have found the defendant
liable under Kiefer-Stewart and Simpson v. Union Oil Co.57 In Broussard
v. Socony Mobil Oil Co.,58 the Fifth Circuit had held that a gasoline supplier was not entitled to summary judgment in a suit brought by one
53 See infta notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
54 375 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. dismissed, 389 U.S. 801 (1967).
55 See id. at 276 (Coffin, J., concurring).
56 See id. at 277-78 (Coffin, J., concurring). Judge Coffin explained that an
agreement between manufacturers to impose maximum resale prices is unlawful because "(a) an identical or parallel system of maximum prices between two competing
sets of dealers is likely to become a system of minimum prices and (b) the motive of
each manufacturer is likely to be something other than maximizing his own return."
Id. Neither argument makes much sense.
57 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (holding that vertical, minimum retail price fixing imposed
by a manufacturer under the guise of consignment agreements is illegal per se).
58 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
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of its dealers where the dealer unwillingly reduced his price at the
insistence of the defendant.
In all, Albrecht was a foundational case. Only in Kiefer-Stewart had
the Supreme Court confronted an apparently similar issue, but the
cases were potentially distinguishable on important legal and economic dimensions. And the opinion in that case was hardly edifying.
B. Between Albrecht and ARGO
During the first nine years after Albrecht, the lower courts applied
the rule laid down there in a handful of cases. 5 9 But by 1977, the
Supreme Court's approach to antitrust had changed fundamentally.
The Court came to see efficiency, which often can be described as
consumer welfare, as the goal of antitrust law, and it set about to rework antitrust doctrine accordingly. 60 Two decisions issued in 1977
bore heavily on the continuing vitality of the Albrecht rule.
In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,61 the Court held
that nonprice vertical restraints imposed by a manufacturer on its
dealers are lawful if reasonable. Thus, for example, a manufacturer
can agree to grant a distributor an exclusive territory. Recall that the
Albrecht Court had all but held that exclusive dealerships are illegal
per se. Some lower courts, therefore, interpreted Sylvania as a repudiation of the logic of Albrecht, and hence its result: if a manufacturer
can confer exclusive territories on its dealers in order to stimulate the
provision of point-of-sale services by eliminating the risk of free riding,
59

See, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding

that a newspaper publisher was liable in an action brought by one of its dealers alleg-

ing vertical maximum price fixing); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242
(2nd Cir. 1975) (holding that an otherwise illegal maximum resale price agreement
between a newspaper and its dealers was protected under the fair trade laws); Blankenship v. Hearst Corp., 519 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that a newspaper dis-

tributor could sue the publisher for fixing the maximum prices that could be charged
by carriers who purchased papers from the distributor); Greene v. General Foods
Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that a food supplier's actions to prevent
its distributor from selling its products to national buyers at prices above those set by

the supplier constituted illegal vertical maximum price fixing); Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 454 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that the holder of several convenience store franchises was entitled to a preliminary injunction preventing termination
of its franchises where the franchisor, inter alia, required franchisees to adhere to the
maximum retail prices set by the franchisor on products some of which the franchisor

supplied).
60 See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTRusT PARADox ix-xiv, 426-39 (Maxwell Macmillan Int'l 1993) (1978); John E. Lopatka, Stephen Breer and Modem Antitrust: A Snug Fit, 40 ANTrrRusT BULL. 1, 23-45 (1995).

61

433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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thereby granting each a monopoly in its brand, then surely the manufacturer can constrain the prices that the monopolist dealer can
charge. 6 2 Besides, if Albrecht was based on the premise that the protection of dealers is a worthy, independent antitrust objective, 63 then the
implication of Sylvania that only consumer welfare matters undercuts
the older case. That reasoning, of course, would have been more
compelling if the Sylvania Court had not explicitly reaffirmed the per
se rule against vertical minimum price fixing, 64 a practice that typically serves the interests of consumers. Still, the argument was strong
enough to persuade these courts.
In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,6 5 the Court articulated the antitrust injury doctrine. The Court held that, in order to
recover damages pursuant to Section 4 of the Clayton Act, 66 a private
plaintiff must suffer "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants'
acts unlawful." 67 The doctrine is based on the premise that Congress
intended to allow private parties to sue under the antitrust laws only to
remedy the kind of harm it wanted to avoid. 68 Because Congress intended the antitrust laws to deter practices that reduce efficiency, and
hence consumer welfare, a private plaintiff seeking antitrust relief
must assert an injury that predictably varies in size with the ineffi62 See, e.g., Acquaire v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 24 F.3d 401 (2nd Cir. 1994)
(questioning validity of Albrecht in light of Sylvania); Jack Walters & Sons Corp. V.
Morton Bldg., Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 706-07 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (suggesting that
"the continued vitality of Albrecht is in doubt after" Sylvania). Indeed, the Supreme

Court later acknowledged that, after Sylvania, "[t] he procompetitive potential of a
vertical maximum price restraint is more evident... than it was when Albrecht was
decided, because exclusive territorial arrangements and other nonprice restrictions
were unlawful per se in 1968." Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S.
328, 343 n.13 (1990).
63 See supra note 11.
64 See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
65 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
66 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994) (allowing "any person who shall be injured in his busi-

ness or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws" to recover
treble damages).
67 Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 489. Later, in Cargill,Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado,Inc., 479
U.S. 104 (1986), the Court held that a plaintiff must allege threatened antitrust injury

in order to obtain an injunction pursuant to Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 26 (Supp. I 1996).

68 AsJudge Posner has noted, this principle is an application of the long-accepted
tort doctrine that a plaintiff cannot establish that the defendant was negligent per se
merely by showing that the defendant violated a statute and that the plaintiff was
injured as a result. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the statute was intended to
prevent the kind of harm the plaintiff suffered. See Jack Walters & Sons Corp. v.
Morton Building, Inc., 737 F.2d 698, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ciency produced by the defendant's conduct. 69 When a supplier and

its dealers agree to a resale price ceiling, both those dealers and competing dealers may lose profits. Some courts held that the profits lost
by competing dealers because of a maximum resale price restraint do
not constitute antitrust injury, for they represent losses incurred as a
result of stiffer competition from rivals charging lower prices, not as a
result of lessened competition.7 0 Other courts held that even the
dealers subject to the vertical price cap suffer no antitrust injury, for
the profits they are prevented from earning are monopoly profits ineligible for antitrust protection. 71 Not every court interpreted Sylvania
and Brunswick as effectively overruling Albrecht 2 But the foundation
had cracked.
Then came ARCO.73 The defendant, an integrated oil company,
imposed retail price ceilings on its independent, branded dealers. An
operator of competing gasoline stations lost profits as a result and
challenged the maximum retail price agreements between ARCO and
its ARCO-brand dealers under Section 1, claiming its lost profits as
damages. The Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the antitrust injury doctrine, declaring that a private party cannot recover unless it is
"adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's
conduct."7 4 The Court then held that profits lost by a firm as a result
of an agreement between its competitor and that competitor's supplier setting a maximum, nonpredatory resale price do not constitute
antitrust injury. The Court assumed arguendo that vertical, maximum
price fixing continues to be illegal per se. 75 But it concluded that the
loss suffered by a rival of a firm pricing under a ceiling does not resemble any of the harms described in Albrecht.76 Indeed, if any of
69 See generally William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, Antitrust Injury, Merger Policy,
and the Competitor Plaintiff,82 IowA L. REV. 127 (1996); William H. Page, The Scope of
Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445 (1985).
70 See, e.g., Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409 (7th
Cir. 1989); see also Roger D. Blair &Jeffrey L. Harrison, RethinkingAntitrust Injury, 42
VAD.L. REv. 1539 (1989).
71 See, e.g., Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 708-09; Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978).
72 See, e.g., Northwest Publications, Inc. v. Crumb, 752 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1985);
Blanton v. Mobil Oil Corp., 721 F.2d 1207 (9th Cir. 1983); Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46
(2nd Cir. 1980); Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979).
73 Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990) [hereinafter
ARCO].
74 Id. at 339.
75 See id, at 335 n.5.
76 See id. at 336.
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those harms does materialize, the rival would enjoy a competitive
boon. Thus, for example, if the price were set too low to allow dealers
to provide desired services or set in such a way as to channel sales

77
Simithrough large distributors, competing dealers would benefit.

larly, a competitor would benefit if rival dealers entered into an arrangement that took on the characteristics of a minimum price fixing
78
conspiracy.
Although the Court held that dealers cannot challenge vertical,
nonpredatory, maximum price fixing to which their competitors are
parties, some passages of the opinion suggest that even dealers subject
to supplier-imposed price ceilings suffer no antitrust injury. For instance, the Court broadly proclaimed, "[I]n the context of pricing
practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive effect." 79 Then, without distinguishing between those dealers constrained by the arrangement and those competing with them, the
Court declared, "Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how
those prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels,
they do not threaten competition. Hence, they cannot give rise to
antitrust injury."80 If capped prices "cannot give rise to antitrust injury," no private party, including a dealer subject to the ceiling, can
sue. Further, the Court implied that the demise of an inefficient competing dealer as a result of vertical maximum price fixing does not
constitute an antitrust injury. 81 If maximum resale price fixing channels sales through large dealers and thereby drives from the market
inefficient small dealers subject to the constraint, one would similarly
assume that the loss of those dealers does not constitute antitrust
injury.
Yet even if one could derive an argument from the logic of the
opinion that dealers constrained by price ceilings imposed by their
suppliers cannot obtain antitrust relief, the Court quashed it in unambiguous dicta. The Court remarked that, if vertical, maximum price
fixing "causes the anticompetitive consequences detailed in Albrecht,
82
consumers and the manufacturers' own dealers may bring suit."

ARCO, therefore, squarely rejected, albeit in dicta, the developing line
of authority in the lower courts that dealers bound by resale price caps
suffer no antitrust injury. But it did more. It implicitly rejected the
proposition that Albrecht did not survive Sylvania. The ARCO Court
77 See id. at 336-37.
78 See id. at 337.
79 Id. at 339.
80 Id. at 340.
81 See id. at 337-38 n.7.
82 Id. at 345.
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acknowledged the procompetitive potential of vertical maximum
price fixing and noted that, because of Sylvania, the consumer benefits of the practice are more significant than they were when Albrecht
was decided.8 3 Nevertheless, the Court stated that the practice can be
challenged by consumers and constrained dealers.
In all, ARCO has a schizophrenic quality.8 4 The Court was unwilling to reconsider the rule that maximum vertical price fixing is illegal
per se, but it offered compelling explanations of the efficiency-enhancing capacity of the practice and little discussion of its anticompetitive potential. It explained why rival dealers suffer no antitrust injury
using logic suggesting that constrained dealers likewise suffer no such
injury, but declared that constrained dealers can sue.
C.

The Impact of ARCO on the Lower Courts

ARCO's wake buffeted the lower courts. Only an audacious court
would have denied antitrust standing to a dealer complaining about a
maximum resale price agreement imposed upon him by his supplier.8 5 But why the injury he suffers from being forced to lower his
prices is antitrust injury was obscure. The "anticompetitive consequences detailed in Albrecht" were far from obviously
86
anticompetitive.
Thus, the Albrecht Court's first assertion, that maximum resale
price fixing "may severely intrude upon the ability of buyers to compete,"8 7 is opaque. If dealers are injured because of the other consequences specified, then the suggestion has no independent content.
If they are otherwise injured, the source of that injury is simply impossible to see. To be sure, a maximum resale price constraint will limit
83 See id. at 343 n.13.
84 For a detailed analysis of ARCO, see Roger D. Blair & Gordon L. Lang, Albrecht After ARCO: Maximum Resale Price Fixing Moves Toward the Rule of Reason, 44
VAND. L. REv. 1007 (1991).

85 One court was that bold. See Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke
Aktiengesellschaft, 821 F. Supp. 802 (D.P.R. 1993) (granting summary judgment for
the defendant on the strength of ARCO by concluding that a dealer subject to a maximum resale price restraint suffers no antitrust injury), vacated, 19 F.3d 745 (lst Cir.
1994). In Khan, the district court also granted summaryjudgment to a supplier in a
case brought by its dealer complaining about resale maximum price fixing, but the
court rested its conclusion on the ground that the practice is to be judged under the
rule of reason and that the plaintiff had failed to establish the predicates for recovery
under that standard. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1360 (7th Cir. 1996)
(describing the unreported district court decision), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct.
275 (1997).
86 ARCO, 495 U.S. at 345 (emphasis added).
87 Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152.
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the dealer's pricing freedom-that is a tautology. But a restraint on
88
liberty, though in some contexts offensive to the Fifth Amendment,
does not by itself represent a loss of consumer welfare. Indeed, if suppliers respond to the illegality of resale price caps by integrating into
distribution, dealers will not only lose their pricing freedom, but their
very existences as dealers.8 9
Second, to claim that the supplier might set prices too low to enable the dealer to provide services that customers want is to deny that
the supplier can act in its own best interests. Of course, a supplier
typically must determine the services that customers on average desire
and set a price cap accordingly, for it is often impractical for a supplier to treat multiple retail markets individually. And additional services provided by a particular dealer in an unusual market might
benefit the supplier, the dealer, and his customers. 90 But the supplier
will only willingly injure itself in the idiosyncratic market-by setting
the ceiling too low-if consumers and the supplier benefit in the aggregate. 91 The economic interests of the supplier and consumers coalesce. Preventing the price cap in an effort to favor the small group of
consumers hardly serves the interests of consumers collectively.
Third, if Albrecht meant to protect small, inefficient dealers by
preventing a practice that favors large, efficient ones, the harm sought
to be averted is not antitrust injury. Antitrust injury presupposes a
consumer welfare loss, and just how consumer welfare is threatened
by channeling distribution through large dealers is unclear. 92 Perhaps a small dealer would provide more service than large dealers to
consumers who desire it, albeit at a higher price. The elimination of
88

U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be ...

property, without due process of law ...

89
90

deprived of life, liberty, or

.").

See 8 PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 1635, at 395 (1989).
It is not likely, however, that Khanwas a case in which transaction costs prohib-

ited the supplier from setting an individual profit-maximizing price in a market in
which an unusually high level of services was desired. See infra note 195.

91 Ward Bowman explained the essence of this phenomenon in the context of
minimum resale price fixing. See Bowman, supra note 23, at 842-43. He suggested
that, if a manufacturer's product is sold in one market in which the product alone is
desired and in another market in which the product plus service is desired, and if the
manufacturer cannot sell his product at different prices to dealers in these markets,
"the manufacturer is faced with a difficult question of sales policy." Id at 842. The
manufacturer must choose between supporting the service dealers or the non-service
dealers, and it will make its choice in the way that maximizes its profits. Either way, of
course, some consumers gain and others lose.
92 Consumers choose to buy from the large, low-price dealers and thereby cause
the demise of the small, inefficient dealers. In effect, consumers vote for efficiency

over protection.
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the small dealer would indeed injure those consumers who would
thereby be foreclosed from services they value. But this argument becomes a close variant of the first one, that the cap may be set too low
to provide the services consumers demand, and it fails for the same
reason: the manufacturer will act to deny consumers services they
value only if it is efficient in the aggregate to do so.
Finally, vertical minimum price fixing is itself often procompetifive, and when it is not, it can be condemned for what it is-anticompetitive resale price maintenance. It need not be outlawed for what it
pretends to be. Besides, when a dealer complains, an easy test exists
to determine whether maximum vertical price fixing in form is minimum vertical price fixing in fact, and all of the Court's maximum resale price cases fail it. One cannot look for price uniformity. If the
price ceiling serves any economic function, it will constrain prices because, to one extent or another, all dealers want to price above the
cap. Actual prices, therefore, will indeed tend to be uniform. Rather,
the tip-off has to do with cheating on the agreement. Any cheating on
a minimum price agreement would take the form of a price below the
stipulated resale price. But in Albrecht and ARGO, as well as in KieferStewart, for that matter, the dealer complained that it was prevented
from raising the price. If maximum vertical price fixing is going to be
condemned because it has the effects of resale price maintenance,
that ground crumbles when the supplier stops the dealer from increasing the price.
In the end, lower courts were compelled to reach a legal conclusion without much of an economic rationale, and predictably they
struggled. What is worse, if courts were forced to hold that constrained dealers suffer antitrust injury when they could perceive no
anticompetitive effect flowing from the practice, maybe antitrust injury could be discerned in a score of practices that apparently have no
adverse economic consequences. Despite the ARCO Court's ardent
refusal "to dilute the antitrust injury requirement," the vitality of that
doctrine was indeed placed in jeopardy. 93 Two appellate court decisions, each authored by a respected antitrust scholar, illustrate the
dilemma.
1.

The First Circuit: Caribe BMW

In CaribeBMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG,9 4 the First Circuit, in an opinion by then-Chief Judge Breyer, held that a car dealer
might be able to recover profits lost as a result of a maximum resale
93 ARCO, 495 U.S. at 345.
94 19 F.3d 745 (1st Cir. 1994).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL- 74:1

price restraint imposed on it by its supplier, and so it vacated the grant
of summary judgment for the defendant.9 5 ButJudge Breyer was torn.
He acknowledged, in an understatement, that "Albrecht has proved a
controversial case," noting that it outlawed procompetitive uses of
maximum resale price fixing.9 6 But he tried to make sense of ARCO
by explaining how the challenged practice can have anticompetitive
consequences and thereby inflict antitrust injury on a dealer, such as
the plaintiff Caribe, bound by the price restraint. In general, he
noted that the practice does not cause antitrust harm unless it reduces
the number of those dealers subject to it or reduces their sales. 97 Specifically, he stated, "At least in theory, if customers would have preferred a higher price and consequently better product quality or
greater service, the agreement forced Caribe to provide less of what
they wanted; the agreement thereby might have led to lower Caribe
profits."9 8 He did not explain that the supplier would have injured

itself by imposing such a price ceiling unless the dealer's particular
market was unusual and, given relevant transaction costs, could not
profitably be treated differently. Judge Breyer continued, "And, at
least in theory, if the agreement helped other, larger BMW dealers, Caribe is the firm that would have suffered."9 9 True enough, but Judge
Breyer did not explain why Caribe's suffering in that case would have
related to an inefficient (i.e., anticompetitive) aspect of the arrangement. Judge Breyer did not even allude to the possibility that BMW's
pricing system took on all of the effects of minimum resale price fixing, perhaps because he realized that Caribe was not trying to lower its
prices. Nor did he cite the abject limitation of the dealer's pricing
freedom, perhaps because he understood that the concept is vacuous.
Use of the qualification "at least in theory," twice no less, seems to
bespeak skepticism. The impression that Judge Breyer harbored
doubts that the practice would in fact have the effects described is
reinforced by his further admonition that, if the profits the plaintiff
lost because of the price cap were supracompetitive profits, "it is at
least arguable that no 'antitrust injury' occurred."10 0 In all, the opin95 For a critique of the decision, see Roger D. Blair, The Ghost ofAlbrecht: Garibe
BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 205
(1995). Hereafter, we omit for convenience the "chief" in reference to then-Chief
Judge Breyer.
96 CaribeBMW, 19 F.3d at 753.
97 See id. at 753.
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 Id. (emphasis added).
100 Id. at 753-54.
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ion reads as that of a judge uneasy with the conclusion he feels compelled to reach.
2.

The Seventh Circuit: Khan

In Khan itself,10 1 Chief Judge Posner'0 2 exhibited the same intellectual conflict, only it was more acute, and his disquietude more
painful to witness. The gasoline dealer in Khan sought to recover profits lost as a result of what was in effect a resale price cap imposed by
his supplier. State Oil, the supplier, owned a convenience store and
gas station that it leased to Khan for the sale of "Union 76" gasoline. 0 3 Under the lease contract, Khan was required to buy all of his
gasoline from State Oil.104 State Oil would suggest a retail price and
sell gasoline to Khan for 3.25 cents less than that price.' 0 5 If Khan
believed that the retail price was too low, he could ask State Oil to
raise it. If State Oil refused, Khan could raise his price anyway, but
then Khan would be required to rebate the difference between his
new price and the suggested price multiplied by the quantity sold. As
a result, the contract required Khan to rebate the entire incremental
profit earned by raising retail price above the one State Oil stipulated.
After Khan fell behind in his lease payments, State Oil moved to evict
him. 0 6 While those proceedings continued, the state court appointed a receiver to operate the station, and for five months the receiver increased profits, apparently by raising the price of premium
grades above the suggested maxima and failing to rebate the extra
profit.' 0 7 Khan inferred that he would have earned higher profits
101 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 118
S. Ct. 275 (1997).
102 Hereafter, we omit for convenience the "Chief" in reference to Chief Judge
Posner.
103 See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1359-60. The circuit court did not mention that Khan
leased a convenience store from State Oil, but the Supreme Court did. See Khan v.
State Oil Co., 118 S.Ct. 275, 278 (1997). Khan himself signed the dealership contract
with State Oil, and his corporation, Khan &Associates, Inc., operated the station. See
Kan, 93 F.3d at 1360. Both Khan and his corporation sued State Oil, but for convenience we refer to them collectively as "Khan."
104 See Khan,93 F.3d at 1360.
105 See id.
106 See id. at 1365.
107 See id. The circuit court reported only that the receiver charged a higher price
for gasoline than the specified maximum. The Supreme Court, however, noted that
the receiver raised price above the maximum only for premium grades and lowered
the price of regular-grade gasoline. See Khan, 118 S.Ct. at 278. According to the
Court, the receiver increased his profit margin in part by reducing the price of regular-grade gasoline below suggested price. See id. Under the contract, however, if
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while he was operating the station had he not been constrained by the
resale price ceiling. The court had no trouble characterizing the arrangement as maximum vertical price fixing, for the contract made it
worthless for the dealer to price above the suggested ceiling.10 8 The
rebate mechanism was simply a method of enforcing the maximum
resale price agreement, and one probably equally effective as terminating a dealer that priced above the cap.
Judge Posner traced the evolution of the rules against price fixing, calling the Court's decision to make vertical minimum price fixing illegal per se "questionable." 10 9 He outlined the monopsony
potential of a horizontal agreement to impose maximum resale price
restraints, suggesting implicitly that it justified per se condemnation.1 10 He also articulated an efficiency-increasing explanation for
vertical maximum price fixing.1"' Thus, if a distinctive brand gives the
supplier at least a modicum of monopoly power and, in order to induce dealers to provide services, the supplier selects dealer locations
to limit competition among its dealers, the supplier might fix a maximum resale price to prevent the dealers from exploiting their monopoly positions to the supplier's detriment.1 12 But he observed, with a
hint of exasperation, "Despite these points, the Supreme Court has
Khan lowered retail price below the suggested price, State Oil was not obligated to
reduce wholesale price; Khan originally argued that this feature of the contract
amounted to minimum resale price fixing, butJudge Posner rejected the claim, Khan,
93 F.3d at 1360, and it was not considered by the Supreme Court. After remand of
the case by the Supreme Court for consideration of the maximum price fixing claim
under the rule of reason, the plaintiff dropped this claim. See Khan v. State Oil Co.,
143 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 1998). Instead, he reasserted his contention that the arrangement with State Oil amounted to minimum vertical price fixing. He claimed that, as a
practical matter, he could not sell below the price suggested by State Oil because he
could not afford a smaller margin between wholesale and retail price. See id. at 364.
Again, Judge Posner rejected the argument, this time calling it "frivolous": "[Ilt
amounts to saying that a supplier must reduce his price to his retailer in order to
enable the retailer to cut prices without sacrifice of margin. A supplier is free to
charge any price he wants to his retailers." Id
108 See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1360-61. Khan also asserted a cause of action for breach
of contract, claiming that, by being prevented from earning higher profits by pricing
below the suggested retail price, he was denied his implicit contractual right to earn a
realistic competitive return on his investment. See id. at 1366. State Oil conceded its
contractual obligation to permit Khan to earn such a return, but the evidence was
insufficient to permit the inference that Khan was denied the opportunity to earn a
normal return. See id
109 Id. at 1361.
110 See id,
111 See id. at 1362.
112 For a detailed economic analysis of the successive monopoly phenomenon, see
infra notes 160-68 and accompanying text.
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thus far refused to reexamine the cases in which it has held that resale
price fixing is illegal per se regardless of the competitive position of
3
the price fixer or whether the price fixed is a floor or a ceiling.""
The defendant argued that Albrecht was inconsistent with the
Court's antitrust injury cases and was thus no longer good law. The
court was impressed. Wrote Judge Posner, 'We have considerable
sympathy with the argument ....

In fact, we think the argument is

right and that it may well portend the doom of Albrecht." 1 4 Nevertheless, the court concluded that the Supreme Court had not expressly
overruled Albrecht and that, as an inferior court, it had no choice but
to apply the precedent:
Yet despite all its infirmities, its increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten
foundations, Albrecht has not been expressly overruled .... And the
Supreme Court has told the lower federal courts, in increasingly
emphatic, even strident, terms, not to anticipate an overruling of a
decision by the Court; we are to leave the overruling to the Court
itself. Albrecht was unsound when decided, and is inconsistent with
later decisions by the Supreme Court. It should be overruled.
Someday, we expect, it will be.... [But] [i] t is not our place to
overrule Albrecht, and Albrecht cannot fairly be distinguished from
5
this case.11
Indeed, in determining that the Court had never expressly overruled Albrecht, Judge Posner understated the vitality of the case. He
noted that the Court in ARCO "was willing to assume only 'arguendo'
that Albrecht had been correctly decided," 16 but he did not mention
that the Court also affirmatively stated that dealers subject to the constraint and consumers are entitled to sue.
Although both Judge Breyer and Judge Posner reluctantly found
that a dealer bound by a price cap may challenge it, they reconciled
the result with the antitrust injury doctrine in significantly different
ways. Judge Breyer reasoned that vertical maximum price fixing can
have anticompetitive effects in an economically meaningful sense, and
that a dealer subject to the ceiling can suffer an injury related to the
anticompetitive aspect of the restraint. Thus, he even went so far as to
suggest that not every constrained dealer suffers antitrust injury. A
113 Khan, 93 F.3d at 1362.
114 Id. at 1363. Judge Posner went on to cite his opinion in Jack Walters & Sons
Corp. v. Morton Building Inc., 737 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1984), noting that the decision
suggested that Albrecht is inconsistent with Sylvania. See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1363. Curiously, he did not mention that the court in Jack Walters also opined that Albrecht is
inconsistent with the antitrust injury cases. See Jack Walters, 737 F.2d at 708-09.
115 Kkan, 93 F.3d at 1363-64 (citations omitted).

116 Id. at 1363.
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dealer that is prevented by his supplier from raising his price above
the competitive level might not suffer antitrust injury; a dealer that
cannot raise his price to cover the increased costs associated with bet11 7
ter service does.
By contrast, Judge Posner was unable to conceive of a case in
which vertical maximum price fixing "could cause an injury to the
interests protected by antitrust law,"11 8 and so he implicitly rejected
the claim that the effects first described by the Albrecht Court and relied upon by Judge Breyer were in fact anticompetitive. The distinction Judge Breyer drew between a dealer losing monopoly profits and
one unable to provide additional service became meaningless under
Judge Posner's logic, for the loss suffered by a dealer never represents
an efficiency loss. Moreover, Judge Posner's analysis led him to make
the facially surprising assertion that, if no one suffers an antitrust injury, even the federal government would be precluded from challenging vertical maximum price fixing.1u 9 The antitrust injury
120
requirement is derived from sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act,
provisions that authorize private antitrust suits, and would appear to
have no bearing on the right of the government to challenge a practice. 121 But Judge Posner likely reasoned that if antitrust injury presupposes inefficiency and no private party ever suffers such harm from
maximum resale price fixing, then even the government is barred
from attacking the practice because it is not anticompetitive, a condi22
tion necessary for a substantive antitrust violation.'
Actually, by professing an inability to hypothesize "an injury to
the interests protected by antitrust law" flowing from purely vertical,
maximum price fixing, Judge Posner either overstated his position or
intended to imply that not all inefficient conduct offends the antitrust
117 See Caribe BMW, Inc., v. Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, 19 F.3d
745, 753-54 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[I]nsofar as Caribe's claim of 'lost profits' refers to
'losses' that occurred because the agreement prevented Caribe from raising prices
above the competitive level, it is at least arguable that no 'antitrust injury' occurred.").
118 Khan, 93 F.3d at 1364. Judge Posner noted that "State Oil is not able to identify any cases, real or hypothetical, in which the practice condemned in Albrecht could
cause" an antitrust injury, and he volunteered no such example himself. Id.
119 See id. at 1364 ("If proof of antitrust injury is required in cases involving the
sort of price fixing involved in Albrecht, no such case could be brought, whether by a
private plaintiff or by the Department ofJustice or the Federal Trade Commission.").

120

15 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1996).

121 As the ARCO Court explained, the antitrust injury requirement "prevents
losses that stem from competition from supporting suits by private plaintiffsfor either
damages or equitable relief." ARCO, 495 U.S. 328, 342 (1990) (emphasis added).
122 In other words, if there is no antitrust injury because the practice has no anticompetitive consequences, a substantive rule prohibiting the practice is unjustified.
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laws. Recall that he had explained the per se condemnation of horizontal agreements to impose maximum resale price restraints on the
ground that they might represent the creation and exploitation of monopsony power in the purchase of distribution services. 123 The arrangement produces an inefficiency, and as Judge Posner implicitly
noted, the same effect can result from a wholly vertical maximum
price restraint if the upstream firm is a monopsonist. 12 4 A single supplier with monopsony power in the distribution services market is
wildly improbable, but it is not inconceivable. 1 25 Indeed, Judge Posner imagined it. Either he forgot, or more likely, he would argue that
the exploitation of monopsony power that is not created by horizontal
collusion, though genuinely inefficient, is not something antitrust law
is set against.
Whatever his view of the unilateral exploitation of monopsony
power, Judge Posner felt compelled to conclude that the Supreme
Court's conception of antitrust injury must include harms that are unrelated to an efficiency loss. He pointed to Sylvania, where the Court
simultaneously recognized that nonprice vertical restraints can increase competition and asserted that vertical minimum price fixing is
illegal per se.
The Court must think that preventing intrabrand price competition
harms an interest protected by the antitrust laws even if the restriction increases competition viewed as a process for maximizing consumer welfare and even if a restriction that had similar effects but
was not an explicit regulation of price would be lawful. If this is
what the Court believes-and it does appear to be the Court's current position, though not one that is easy to defend in terms of
economic theory or antitrust policy-the Court may also think that
interfering with the freedom of a dealer to raise prices may cause
26
antitrust injury.'
Judge Posner "suspect[ed]" that the Court would not find such a
constraint on pricing freedom to be antitrust injury, but had insufficient confidence in his suspicion to declare the Albrecht rule defunct.127 The implication of the Court's decision in ARCO to
distinguish the complaint of the rival dealer from the complaint of the
123 See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1361.
124 See id. at 1362 ("As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a
monopsonist he cannot squeeze his dealers' margins below a competitive level.. .
(emphasis added).
125 For a fuller explanation of this point, see infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
126 Khan, 93 F.3d at 1364.
127 Id.
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restricted dealer is that "the injury to a dealer like Khan from not
being able to raise his price because of a restriction imposed by his
1 28
supplier is antitrust injury."
In terms of the antitrust injury doctrine, then, the positions taken
by Judges Breyer and Posner were both problematic. Judge Breyer
ostensibly preserved the integrity of the doctrine by finding that vertical maximum price fixing can have anticompetitive effects, dutifully
alluding to the consequences that the Supreme Court in Albrecht and
ARCO had declared to be harmful. But those anticompetitive effects
are phantoms. Judge Posner recognized that the practice causes no
anticompetitive harm, but was then compelled to mangle the antitrust
injury doctrine by proclaiming that it encompasses effects that reflect
no efficiency loss, leaving its limits ominously unspecified.
III.

XrHAVIN THE SUPREME COURT

On review of Khan, the Supreme Court commended the Seventh
Circuit for faithfully applying Albrecht,129 then overruled the case in a
unanimous decision written by Justice O'Connor. The Court offered
its own sketch of the evolution of antitrust doctrine, beginning with
the per se rule against vertical minimum price fixing laid down in Dr.
Miles.' 30 It noted the broad condemnation of horizontal price agreements set forth in Socony-Vacuum and the decision in Kiefer-Stewart to
strike down an agreement between affiliated distillers to impose resale
price ceilings.' 3 1 Turning to nonprice distributional restraints, the
Court cited White Motor Co. v. United States,'3 2 where the Court refused
to hold such restrictions illegal per se for want of sufficient experience
analyzing them, and United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,1 s3 where it

decided four years later that it then knew enough to condemn them
per se.' 3 4 Interestingly, though understandably, the Court's recitation
of this doctrinal history is largely descriptive. Whereas Judge Posner
128

Id.

129 The Court remarked, "The Court of Appeals was correct in applying [the]
principle [of stare decisis] despite disagreement with Albrecht, for it is this Court's
prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents." Khan v. State Oil Co., 118 S. Ct.
275, 284 (1997).
130 See id at 279.
131 See id at 279-80.
132 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
133 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
134 See Khan, 118 S.Ct. at 280.
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had identified the "questionable next step.., in the evolution of antitrust law,"'13 5 the Supreme Court's recounting is distinctly noncritical.
The Court located Albrecht in this chronology, observing that the
case was decided the term after Schwinn.13 6 The Court then noted
that Sylvania overruled Schwinn in 1977, thereby providing itself with a
modem precedent for overruling an antitrust precedent. It observed
that subsequent cases, most importantly including ARCO, "hinted that
the analytical underpinnings of Albrecht were substantially weakened
137
by" Sylvania.
Having set the stage, the Court proceeded to explain that its reconsideration of Albrecht was guided by essentially two principles.
First, the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand, not intrabrand, competition, a proposition firmly established
in Sylvania and reaffirmed in Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.l 3s Second, consumers benefit from low prices, so that condemning practices that reduce prices is especially costly, a proposition
recited in ARCO and Matsushita ElectricalIndustrial Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp.'3 9 Given this guidance, the Court found "it difficult to maintain
that vertically-imposed maximum prices could harm consumers or
competition to the extent necessary to justify their per se invalida135 Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996) (alluding to the per
se rule against minimum resale price fixing established in Dr. Miles), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997).
136 See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 280.
137 Id. at 281. The Court cited Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Society, 457 U.S.
332, 348 n.18 (1982), where the Court had opined that vertical restraints are generally more defensible than horizontal restraints and 324 Liquor Corp. v. DufJ, 479 U.S.
335, 341-42 (1987), where the Court had remarked that a unilaterally-imposed vertical restraint "may stimulate interbrand competition even as it reduces intrabrand
competition." The Kahn Court commented that the Sylvania Court "declined to comment on Albrecht's per se treatment of vertical maximum price restrictions...." Khan,
118 S. Ct. at 281 (emphasis added). While this observation is technically correct, the
Sylvania Court did not explicitly refuse to address vertical maximum price fixing, but
vertical price fixing generally. Indeed, the passage in Sylvania cited by the Khan
Court seems to relate specifically to minimum resale price maintenance. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 at 51 n.18 (1977).
138 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (holding that an agreement between a manufacturer
and a dealer under which the manufacturer stops dealing with a competing dealer
because of that dealer's failure to comply with suggested minimum resale prices is not
unlawful per se absent a minimum resale price agreement with the surviving dealer).
For this proposition, the Court cited Sharp but not Sylvania. See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at
282.
139 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986) (holding that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment in a case alleging a conspiracy to engage in predatory pricing where under
the circumstances the claim was economically implausible). See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at
282.
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tion." 140 The Court recited Judge Posner's explanation as to how
maximum resale price fixing can benefit consumers by preventing the
exploitation of successive monopolies. 14 1 The Court also acknowledged that the potential consumer benefits of the practice increase as
a result of Sylvania, for that opinion raised the probability of dealer
monopolies. 14 2 The Court cautioned, however, that it was not suggesting "that dealers generally possess" market power, nor was it holding that "a ban on vertical maximum price fixing inevitably has
43
anticompetitive consequences in the exclusive dealer context.'
Turning to the purported benefits of the Albrecht rule, the Court listed
the adverse consequences of vertical maximum price fixing asserted
by the Albrecht Court, and referred approvingly to scholarship arguing
that the effects are either implausible or not anticompetitive.1 4 4 The
Court concluded that these "concerns," which together formed the
basis of the Albrecht decision, cannot support a rule of per se illegality,
though they "can be appropriately recognized and punished under
1 45
the rule of reason."'
The Court bolstered its conclusion that "there is insufficient economic justification for per se invalidation of vertical maximum price
fixing" by noting that public enforcers do not challenge the prac140 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282.
141 See id. (citing Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1362 (7th Cir. 1996). The
Court also cited Robert Bork's commentary on Albrecht that the newspaper intended

to keep prices down to increase circulation and maximize advertising revenue. See
Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282 (citing BORK, supra note 60, at 281-82). For a detailed eco-

nomic analysis of the successive monopoly phenomenon, see infra notes 160-68 and
accompanying text. In a subsequent passage, the Court noted that the Albrecht rule
could "exacerbate problems related to the unrestrained exercise of market power by
monopolist-dealers" and "may actually harm consumers and manufacturers." Khan,
118 S. Ct. at 283. This does not appear to be an independent point, but rather an

alternative way of explaining that maximum resale price fixing usually benefits
consumers.
142

See Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 281.

143

Id at 283.

144

See id. at 282-83; 7 PHILL.IP AREEDA, ANTITRusT LAW 1635 (1989); PHILLIP E.
& HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTrrRusT LAW 729.7 (1996 Supp.); Blair & Lang,
supra note 84, at 1034; Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum PriceFixing,48 U. CHI. L. REV.
886, 907 (1981); Lopatka, supra note 60, at 60; see also supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
145 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 283. Of the adverse consequences specified, the Court
seemed most impressed by the possibility that maximum resale price agreements may
mask minimum resale price arrangements, "which remain illegal per se." Id. The
Court's response was that such arrangements can be punished under the rule of reason, but was careful to note that the other asserted consequences could also be so
addressed.
AREEDA
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tice. 146 The Court rejected Khan's argument that those seeking repeal of the Albrecht rule bear the burden of proving that the rule has
distorted the market. 147 It observed that Albrecht relied only on hypothetical effects and that, even though suppliers have fashioned
schemes to avoid the rule, the hypothesized effects have not materialized. In these circumstances, the Court found, those who would retain the rule bears the burden of justifying it, and they had failed to
do so. In addition, the Court rejected the claim that Albrecht should
be preserved because Congress, despite legislative proposals that
might have affected the rule, had not acted to rescind it.148
Lastly, the Court paid homage to the importance of stare decisis
in establishing the rule of law. It observed that adherence to precedent is "the preferred course,"'1 49 but that the principle "is not an inexorable command.' 50 In the antitrust area, the Court has a
responsibility to adapt the law "to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience," for "Congress 'expected the courts
to give shape"' to the Sherman Act's broad mandate. 15 1 Hence, the
Court has on occasion reversed an antitrust doctrine, including in Sylvania.15 2 The Court found that later cases had so eroded the founda146 Id. (observing that Albrecht has little or no relevance to ongoing enforcement
of the Sherman Act and that "neither the parties nor any of the amici curiae have
called our attention to any cases in which enforcement efforts have been directed
solely against the conduct encompassed by Albrees per se rule").

147 See id. at 283-84.
148 The Court characterized as "misplaced" Khan's reliance on Toolson v. New York
Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (per curiam), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258
(1972). Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284. In both of these cases, the Court refused to reverse

the odd conclusion in FederalBaseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922),
that the business of professional baseball is not subject to the Sherman Act. The
Court reached its conclusion in the latter cases partly on the ground that, despite
proposals to do so, Congress had not acted to subject professional baseball to the

antitrust laws in the decades following FederalBaseball Club. The Khan Court called
these decisions "clearly inapposite." Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284. Moreover, the Court
found that the significance of legislative proposals regarding price fixing was ambigu-

ous, given that they provided neither clear support for nor denunciation of the Albrecht rule. See id.
149 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827
(1991)).
150 Id. at 284 (quoting Payne, 501 U.S. at 828).
151 Id. (quoting National Soc. of Prof'l Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688
(1978)).
152 Id. The Court also cited Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S.
752 (1984), where the Court held that a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary are
incapable of conspiring for purposes of section 1 of the Sherman Act, thereby overturning a principle that had apparently been established in earlier cases. And it cited
Tignerv. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940), where the Court rejected the argument that
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tion of Albrecht that "there is not much of that decision to salvage."'153
Besides, no case reaching the Court since Albrecht had involved pure
vertical maximum price fixing, so the rule of that case was not deeply
54
embedded in Supreme Court precedent.'
In concluding, the Court emphasized that vertical maximum
price fixing is not per se lawful Instead, it instructed, the practice,
"like the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the antitrust
laws, should be evaluated under the rule of reason. In our view, ruleof-reason analysis will effectively identify those situations in which vertical maximum price fixing amounts to anticompetitive conduct."155

a state antitrust law was unconstitutional because it subjected industrial but not agricultural combinations to criminal penalties and explicitly overruled Connolly v. Union
SewerPipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902).
153 Khan, 118 S.Ct. at 285.
154 See id.
155 Id. Judge Posner had found that the plaintiff would lose under the rule of
reason, but the Court nevertheless remanded the case to the appellate court for reconsideration in light of its decision. See id. The Court believed that the appellate
court's observation might have been colored by the existence of the Albrecht rule and
that the lower court should have an opportunity to consider the case with the knowledge that the rule of reason applies. See id.
On remand, Khan abandoned his claim of illegal vertical maximum price fixing,
but renewed his claim that his arrangement with State Oil constituted per se illegal
minimum resale price maintenance. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 143 F.3d 362, 363 (7th
Cir. 1998). He argued that, because State Oil would not lower its wholesale price to
preserve the margin between wholesale price and a retail price lower than that suggested by State Oil, and because he could not afford as a practical matter to earn a
lower margin, he was in effect prevented from selling below the suggested price. See
id. Judge Posner called the argument "frivolous," observing that a supplier has no
antitrust duty to reduce his price to a retailer in order to preserve a particular margin.
Id. See also supra note 107. Khan also argued that he could not make up any lost
margin on gasoline that he sold below the suggested price by selling other grades
above the suggested price, for that would have violated the contract. The court responded that the argument "isflatly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision,
for it would convert every maximum price-fixing case into a minimum price-fixing
case." Khan, 143 F.3d at 363. The court paused only to consider Khan's claim that
the fact that Khan was required to buy gasoline only from State Oil somehow made
the other features of the arrangement illegal. See id The court noted that Khan had
not described the terms of the contract bearing on the effective duration of exclusivity, but concluded that, in the absence of any claim of collusion among suppliers, a
retailer could seek out a supplier who wanted to pursue a low-price strategy. Consequently, Khan had not offered evidence of any adverse effect on the competitive pricing of gasoline. See id,
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IV. AN ECONOMIC
A.

-fHAN

ANALYSIS OF MAXIMUM REsALE PRICE RESTRAiNTs

The Successive Monopolies Problem

In order to better understand the economic irrationality of the
Albrecht rule, it is useful to examine the motivation for maximum resale price fixing. Economic analysis reveals that consumers benefit
from the practice. Assuming that consumer welfare is the primary
concern of antitrust, one is driven to the conclusion that Khan was
long overdue.
Suppose that, because of patent protection, only a single producer makes widgets; in other words, a firm has a perfectly legal monopoly in the production of widgets. From the standpoint of antitrust
policy, it is important that the monopoly in production is legal; otherwise the correct approach would be to challenge that monopoly. The
manufacturer sells its widgets to a distributor that has monopoly
power in its market. This retail market power may arise because the
manufacturer has granted an exclusive distributorship in a local market. In this event, the market structure is one of successive monopoly.15 6
Maximum price restraints arise almost exclusively in markets where
there is some element of successive monopoly, that is, where there is
market power at the production stage and independent market power
at the distribution stage. 157 As the subsequent analysis makes clear,
consumers fare worse in this market structure than they do when a
single, integrated firm has a monopoly of both production and
distribution.
Identifying the sources of monopoly power in the successive monopoly environment can be instructive, for the origins are not immediately apparent in some of the factual contexts addressed by courts.
For our purposes, monopoly power means simply the ability profitably
to price above marginal cost. Stated otherwise, the monopolist faces a
negatively sloped demand; the degree of market power does not affect
the essential economic incentives. So understood, monopoly power
in the upstream market may result from a number of conditions. As
hypothesized above, for example, the firm may have a product monopoly protected by patent, copyright, or similar laws. Or, consumers
may exhibit brand preference for a differentiated product. That may
have been the basis of ARCO's market power, andJudge Posner spec156 A full understanding of successive monopoly dates to at leastJosephJ. Spengler, Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy, 58 J. POL. ECON. 347 (1950). See also Fritz
Machlup & Martha Taber, BilateralMonopoly, Successive Monopoly, and Vertical Integration, 27 ECONOMICA 101 (1960).
157 See any standard microeconomics text, for example ROBERT S. PINDY K &
DANiEL L. RUBInELD, MICROECONOMICS 336-39 (4th ed. 1997).
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ulated that it might have underlaid State Oil's power.'5 8 Alternatively,
a market may be able to support only one supplier of a relatively undifferentiated product. For instance, in Albrecht, perhaps only one
newspaper could survive in the relevant geographic market. Then,
too, the upstream firm may acquire monopoly power by simple ingenuity and innovation, unprotected by legal entry barriers. These
sources of monopoly power are legitimate and unobjectionable on antitrust grounds. Of course, upstream monopoly power may also result
from collusion or anticompetitive exclusion. In that case, the acquisition of monopoly power can be attacked independently; use of maximum vertical price fixing is largely irrelevant.
The downstream monopoly power is typically created by the upstream firm and is a function of the upstream monopoly. The supplier permits only one or a limited number of dealers to distribute its
product in a given area, and the monopoly power enjoyed by the upstream firm is thereby transferred to the downstream firm. A supplier
might choose to confer distribution monopolies because the service
may exhibit economies of scale. In Albrecht, for example, the publisher might have granted carriers exclusive territories because newspaper delivery has natural monopoly characteristics in very small
areas. A supplier might also confer downstream monopoly power because optimal product promotion requires dealer investments, and
the dealer will resist making them if it is subject to free riding; limiting
competition among dealers minimizes the risk of free riding and
therefore encourages demand-increasing investments by dealers. This
15 9
was the scenario envisioned by Judge Posner in Khan.
In Khan, however, there was another potential source of downstream market power. Khan's service station might have had loca158

See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1362 (observing that Union 76 may be "a sufficiently dis-

tinctive and popular brand to give the dealers in question a modicum of monopoly
power").
159 See id. (suggesting that State Oil might have limited competition between its
dealers "to encourage ... dealer services"). The dealer services explanation of maximum vertical price fixing assumes that the supplier imposes a cap on resale prices to
prevent dealers from "exploiting [their] monopoly power fully." Id. One should
however note that, by conferring downstream monopoly power and constraining
price, the supplier may not achieve the desired result. The dealer may skimp on
service and earn monopoly rents at the fixed price. Given this possibility, the supplier
may have to ensure that the desired dealer services are stipulated contractually and
then police the contract. Cf Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair
Trade II?, 33 J.L. & ECON. 409 (1990) (criticizing some theories of minimum resale

price fixing on the ground that, unlike the pure dealer services explanation, which
relies upon competition among dealers to induce them to provide optimal services,
they do not free the supplier from policing contractual service commitments).
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tional advantages that offered the prospect of economic rents in the
sale of any kind of gasoline. In that event, the owner of the station
would have an interest in exploiting the monopoly power incident to
the scarce location. But Khan did not own the station-State Oil did,
and it leased the station to Khan. The dealer, therefore, might have
had monopoly power flowing from consumer preference for the
Union 76 brand or from the valuable location of the station. Either
way, it was the creation of State Oil, and State Oil would have had an
incentive to prevent Khan from reaping the economic rewards to
which it was entitled.
Notice that the existence of market power at the retail level is
necessary to explain the efficiency-enhancing use of a resale price ceiling in a successive monopoly environment, and the leading asserted
anticompetitive effects of the practice assume downstream market
power as well. Thus, for example, the suggestion that a dealer could
expand output and increase profits by providing additional, valuable
services that cannot be offered at the constrained retail price assumes
that the dealer faces a downward-sloping demand curve. The additional services would shift that curve to the right. To put the point
differently, the possibility that the supplier would set a resale price
ceiling below the market-clearing price in a perfectly competitive
downstream market is silly-at least it is sufficiently unlikely to deserve
no place in formulating antitrust policy. Whether one believes that
vertical maximum price fixing is efficient or somehow inefficient,
then, there ought to be no serious disagreement that dealers subject
to the price constraint have some monopoly power for some reason.
Under conditions of successive monopoly, whatever the source of
the power, the manufacturer must take into account the profit maximizing behavior of the distributor. The distributor will maximize its
profit in the usual way by selling that quantity where its marginal revenue equals its marginal cost. In this endeavor, the distributor must
have widgets to sell. It demands widgets for resale-not for its own
use. As a result, the distributor's demand is derived from the consumer demand for widgets. It is this derived demand that the manufacturer faces. The analysis, then, requires that we find the derived
demand for the manufacturer.
In Figure 1, the consumers' demand for widgets is represented by
D and the associated marginal revenue is represented by MR 160 This,
of course, is the demand that the distributor faces. The derived de160 In this example, the consumers' demand is P = 14 - O.02Q and the associated
marginal revenue is MR = 14 - 0.04Q. The specific numerical example is traced
through the analysis to make the general analysis more concrete.
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Price and Cost

100

Quantity

Figure 1
mand of the distributor can be ascertained from the distributor's
profit-maximizing calculus. As we said above, the distributor will maximize its profits by equating marginal revenue (MR) to its marginal
cost. The distributor's marginal cost equals the marginal cost of
goods sold, which is the wholesale price (P ) charged by the manufacturer, plus the marginal cost of performing the distribution function.
The latter is shown in Figure 1 as MCD. Thus, the distributor will sell
that quantity where MR = P, + MCD. Rearranging this condition
reveals the derived demand: P. = MR - MCD. Given the profit-maximizing behavior of the distribution monopolist, the maximum price that
the manufacturer can charge for any specific quantity is the difference
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155

between the marginal revenue at that quantity and the distributor's
marginal cost of performing the distribution function. In Figure 1, we
have shown the derived demand as d = MP? - MCD, and the associated
16 1
marginal revenue is shown as mr.
The manufacturer maximizes its profits by producing that quantity where marginal revenue (mr) equals the marginal cost of production (MCp): mr = MCD. As shown in Figure 1, the profit-maximizing
quantity is 100 widgets. 1 62 The profit maximizing price that corresponds to an output of 100 is found by substituting 100 for Q in the
derived demand. In this example, the optimal wholesale price is
$9.163

Once the manufacturer selects a wholesale price, the marginal
cost of the distributor is determined, for the distributor's marginal
cost is P,, plus MCD. Figure 2 is precisely the same as Figure 1, except
for the addition of the distributor's marginal cost. The distributor will
maximize its profits by selling that quantity where its marginal revenue (MR) equals its marginal cost: MR = Pw + MCD. In our example,
the marginal cost is $10, the optimal output is 100, and the optimal
price to consumers is $12.164
The profits of the producer and the distributor are relatively easy
to show. For the producer, its profit (He) is the difference between
price and cost times the quantity sold: 1l = (Pw - MCp)Q. In our example, this amounts to $400.165 For the distributor, its profit (HID) is calculated in a similar fashion: l'D = (P - PW- MCD)Q. In this example, the
distributor's profit is $200.166 Thus, the total profit when there is successive monopoly is lp + i 1 D, or $600.
This market structure is undesirable from the manufacturer's
perspective because it is possible to generate more profit. We can see
161

The derived demand facing the manufacturer is P. =MR -MCD. Assuming that

= $1, we can use the results from supranote 160 to write P. = 14 - 0.04Q- I or P.
= 13 - 0.04Q. In this case, the marginal revenue will be mr = 13 - 0.08Q.
162 In this example, we have assumed that the marginal cost of production is $5.
Equating marginal revenue from note 161 supra to the marginal cost of production,
13 - 0.08Q = 5, and solving for Qyields the optimal output of 100.
163 The derived demand is P = MR-MCD or P, = 13- 0.04Q. Consequently, when
MCD

Q = 100, P, = 9.
164 Since the wholesale price is $9 and the marginal cost of performing the distribution function is $1, the distributor's marginal cost is $10. The distributor sells the

+ MCD or 14 - 0.04Q = 10, which yields an optimal quantity of
quantity where MR = P1%
100. Substituting Q = 100 into the demand function yields P = 14 - 0.02(100) = 12.
165 Substituting $9 for Pw, $5 for MCQ and 100 for Qin rI = (Pw-MCQp)Qwe have
rlp = (9 - 5)100 = 400.

166 Substituting $12 for P, $9 for Pv $1 for MCD, and 100 for Qin I1 D = (P-PVMCD)Q, we have rID = (12 - 9- 1)100 = 200.
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Price and Cost

Figure 2
this by considering what would happen if the manufacturer were vertically integrated. By this, we mean that the manufacturer would produce the widgets and perform the distribution function itself. In that
case, the manufacturer would produce and distribute that quantity of
widgets where the marginal revenue equals the marginal cost of production plus the marginal cost of distribution: MR = MCp + MCD. In

Figure 3, we have reproduced Figure 2, but we have added the marginal cost of production and distribution (MCp + MCD). In the example,
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this marginal cost is $6 and the profit-maximizing output is 200.167 At
an output of 200, the corresponding profit-maximizing price is $10.168
The manufacturer's profit is given by FI = (P - MCp - MCD)Q which is

$800.
In a successive monopoly situation, vertical integration leads to
an expansion of output, a reduction in price, and an increase in total
profits. In spite of the fact that price is lower, the profit of the vertically integrated monopolist is larger than the sum of the profits
earned by a production monopolist and a separate distribution monopolist. This is the inefficiency associated with the successive monopoly. Thus, one might expect vertical integration to occur under
these structural conditions.
A cat, however, can be skinned in more than one way. The results of vertical integration can be achieved through contractual alter1 69
natives, and one of these methods is maximum resale price fixing.
The manufacturer can determine the optimal price from its perspective. In this case, that price is $10. It agrees to sell its widgets to an
independent distributor on the condition that the distributor not
charge more than $10. In that event, the manufacturer will sell 200
widgets at a price of $9 to the distributor. This wholesale price will
permit the distributor to sell 200 widgets at a retail price of $10 because the marginal cost to the distributor is the wholesale price ($9)
plus the marginal cost of distributing the widgets ($1). Thus, the results of maximum resale pricing are the same as those of vertical integration: Q = 200 and P = $10. The manufacturer's profit is (Pw MCp)Q = (9 - 5)200 = $800. The distribution monopolist is forced to
behave as a competitive firm would, namely, selling that output where
price equals marginal cost. As a result, the distributor's profit is zero:
I1 D = (P - (Pw+ MCD))Q = 0, because P = Pw + MCD. This is not to say

that the distributor just barely breaks even. But the distributor is limited to a competitive return, which is already reflected in its costs.
To recognize that maximum resale price fixing is a ready economic substitute for vertical integration does not imply that a prohibition on the pricing method is costless. One might be tempted to
167 Given the marginal revenue, MR = 14 - 0.04Q and marginal cost, MC =5 +1 =
6, optimal output is found by solving 14- .04Q = 6for Q, which yields a profit maximizing quantity of 200.
168 The profit maximizing price is found by substituting Q = 200 into the demand
function: P = 14 - 0.02Qor P = 14 - 0.02(200) = 10.
169 For extensive examinations, see ROGER D. BI.IR & DAVID L. KAsERMAN, LAw
AND ECONOMJICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983); FREDERICK R. WARREN-BOULTON, VERTICAL CONTROL OF MARKETS: BusiNEss AND LABOR PRACTICES

(1978).
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conclude that, if vertical integration or other contractual devices are
legal and effective alternatives, then the Albrecht rule did no harm.
Indeed, Justice O'Connor in Khan observed that firms "appear to have
fashioned schemes to get around the per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing. 1 70 But good substitutes are rarely perfect substitutes, and the costs associated with using a less desirable alternative to
achieve a beneficial end are borne by society.
Clearly the manufacturer employs maximum resale price restraints in order to improve its profits. Indeed, in our numerical example, its profits double. But the manufacturer's interests and those
170

State Oil v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 283 (1997).
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of consumers coincide. We have already seen that quantity doubles
from 100 to 200 widgets and that price to the consumer falls from $12
to $10. One would suspect that consumer welfare rises as a consequence, and the suspicion is borne out. In the successive monopoly
case described in Figure 2, net consumer surplus (CS) is the area below the demand curve above the price. In our numerical example,
this area will be CS = 1/2(14 - 12)100 = $100. When maximum resale
pricing is employed, consumer surplus rises substantially: CS = 1/2(14 10)200 = $400. Thus, the maximum resale price restraints lead to increased output, reduced prices, and increased consumer welfare.
Recall that in Khan, State Oil owned the service station, and the
station might have been located so advantageously as to generate economic rents. In that case, if State Oil had been vertically integrated, it
would have set a retail price that maximized its profits, as the above
analysis demonstrates. That price might have exceeded the price
charged by stations in inferior locations. But absent a price ceiling, a
lessee-dealer would have an incentive to charge a higher price, one
that increases his profits at the expense of State Oil and consumers.
Again, State Oil might have achieved similar results without capping
resale prices through contractual provisions, but these devices may
have been relatively costly, even prohibitively so. At any rate, State Oil
could not maximize its profits by simply demanding a percentage of
the deal6r's sales revenue. That kind of royalty would function as a
tax on the dealer. The dealer would take into account the cost of the
royalty in setting retail price and would price above the level that
171
would maximize the station owner's profits.
The upshot of this analysis is that the Albrecht rule injured consumer welfare. Protecting the interests of the distributors at the expense of the consumer was economically perverse.
B.

The Monopsony Hypothesis

Justice Harlan and Judge Posner both suggested that one might
consider the retailer's mark-ups, or the difference between the wholesale and the retail prices, as the price the supplier pays for distribution
services. 172 Then, a supplier with monopsony power might impose a
171 See BLAIR& KASERMAN, supranote 169, at 58-68. State Oil in such a case could
be likened to the owner of a valuable patent who, for reasons of efficiency, licenses a
single firm to use the patent. In these circumstances the patentee cannot easily prevent the licensee from siphoning off monopoly profits, and injuring consumers in the
process, without capping output price. See generallyWARn S. BowmA,JR., PATENT AND
ANTIrrusT

LAW

122 (1973).

172 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 164-65 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Easterbrook,
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resale price ceiling to drive its dealers' margins below the competitive
price for distribution services, thereby reducing its cost of distribution; analogously, competing suppliers that collectively have power to
affect the market price of distribution services might agree to impose
a resale price cap for the same reason. The latter case is an example
of a collusive monopsony, and generally an agreement among competitors not to compete in the purchase of goods or services is a per se
1 73
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The exercise of monopsony power, however, whether unilateral
or collusive, is not apt to be the explanation for maximum resale price
fixing. A model of monopsony will illustrate why this is so. In Figure
4, the demand and supply of distribution services are depicted by D
and S, respectively. Assuming a substantial number of buyers and sellers, the intersection of supply and demand will determine the competitive price and quantity, which are P and Qi, respectively. A buyer or
group of colluding buyers with monopsony power will reduce the
quantity of distribution services purchased to Q2, where the marginal
factor cost (MFG) intersects the demand curve. 174 The price of the
distribution services is determined by the supply curve and, therefore,
depressing the quantity to Q results in a decrease in the price from P
to P2.175

This is an inefficient result. The effect of the arrangement is to
reduce quantity and price below the competitive levels. But this outcome depends crucially upon the assumption that the supply of distribution services facing the firm or colluding group of firms accused of
exploiting monopsony power is positively sloped. In the real world,
supra note 144, at 888 & n.7 (noting that Albrecht can be viewed as a monopsony
problem, but concluding that such an interpretation is implausible).
173 See supranote 38 and accompanying text. For a more extensive examination of
the law and economics of monopsony, see

ROGER

MONOPsONY- ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS

D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L.

HARRISON,

(1993).

174 When a single buyer faces a positively sloped supply curve for an input, say,
labor (L), its profits (1l) function can be written as FI = PQ - w(L)L - rK, where P and
Q denote price and output, respectively, w(L) is the wage rate, which depends on the
amount of labor hired, and r is the price of capital (K). Then, in order to maximize
profits, the monopsonist must hire labor to the point where MI/ML = P(MQ/ML) [w + L(dw/dL)] = 0. The first term, P(MQ/ML), is the value of the marginal product
of labor, which is the demand. The second term, w + L(dw/dL), is the marginal factor
cost. The marginal factor cost is the incremental effect of a small increase in employment on the total wage bill. Note that the marginal factor cost exceeds the wage
because dw/dL, the slope of the supply curve, is positive and, therefore, w + L(dw/dL)
> w, as shown in Figure 4.

175 The effect of this exercise of monopsony power is to reduce the monopsonist's
average cost. This, of course, will increase its profits, which explains why a monopsonist will reduce employment.
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we surmise that rarely, if ever, will a single buyer or any plausible conspiring group of buyers of distribution services confront a positively
sloped supply curve. Notice that, if the buyers in question face a horizontal supply curve, that curve will coincide with the marginal factor
cost curve, and the buyers will not be able to affect price by reducing
the quantity purchased. A positively sloped supply curve implies that
the resources necessary to provide the services in question are specialized to the needs of the buyers under consideration. Thus, if the
buyer demanded less, the supplier would not easily be able to shift to
an alternative buyer. The resources necessary to provide distribution
services, however, tend not to be specialized. If a single purchaser of
some kind of distribution services attempted to depress price, dealers
would switch to other buyers desiring the same kind of services; if a
group of firms in the same industry conspired to offer a depressed
price for distribution services, dealers would switch to buyers in other
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industries. 17 6 A multi-industry buyers' cartel large enough to have
monopsony power in the purchase of distribution services seems
fanciful.
For example, in Albrecht, the newspaper publisher needed homedelivery services. No specialized skills are needed to deliver newspapers, which means that newspaper distributors come from the general
labor pool. Thus, the newspaper publisher would be just one among
many employers. These distributors, therefore, could easily shift from
newspaper delivery to some other unskilled occupation. Consequently, from the publisher's perspective, the supply curve is flat at
the competitive wage; that is, the wage that the publisher must pay is
determined by the market and not by how much the publisher hires.
Under these circumstances, the marginal factor cost and the wage rate
coincide, and the publisher has no monopsony power. The publisher,
therefore, would be unable to push the price it paid for distribution
services below the competitive level.
Much the same can be said about the services of independent
gasoline retailers, the services involved in ARCO and Khan. The gasoline supplier drew its dealers from a large pool of potential franchisees. In attracting franchisees, both ARCO and State Oil competed
with scores of other franchisors both in and out of the gasoline industry. Any attempt to pay less than a competitive rate for gasoline retailing services would be futile. Of course, the dealers in these cases
competed with thousands of actual and potential franchisees. Again,
from their perspective, the defendants in both cases confronted horizontal distribution services supply curves.
Kiefer-Stewart is the only case we know of that involved an agreement between ostensible competitors to impose a resale price ceiling.
Justice Harlan and Judge Posner argued that Kiefer-Stewart can be distinguished from Albrecht because of this horizontal aspect; they suggested that only the arrangement in Kiefer-Stewart could appropriately
be held unlawful per se, though neither was deciding that case. But
once again, the distribution of liquor involves no obvious specialized
skill, and so one would assume that a single distiller would have no
monopsony power. For that matter, one would suspect that no two
176 Even though the market supply curve may have a positive slope, any single
employer or even a group of employers is apt to be small relative to the total labor
market. As a result, it behaves as a price taker. In other words, it considers the wage to
be a market determined parameter. It will not consider the wage to be a function of
its employment decision. Thus, from the firm's perspective the supply curve is flat

and it has no monopsony power. See generally Jonathan M. Jacobson & Gary J.
Dorman, Joint Purchasing Monopsony and Antitrust, 36 ANSrrRusT BULL. 1 (1991);
BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 173.
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distillers have monopsony power, and so if we indulge in the sincerepudiated assumption that the affiliated distillers in Kiefer-Stewart
were separate economic entities, they still would not likely have been
able to exploit monopsony power. Indeed, even if all liquor distillers
conspired to depress the price offered for distribution services, wholesalers would seem perfectly capable of selling their services to the
manufacturers of other products.
We do not mean to suggest that agreements among competitors
to impose maximum resale price ceilings on their distributors should
be immune to antitrust attack.' 77 But the argument for per se illegality is demonstrably weaker than it is in the case of other horizontal
agreements to limit price competition. In the case of a naked agreement among sellers to fix price, for example, we assume that there is
no efficiency-enhancing explanation; we make a similar assumption in
the case of a collusive monopsony purchasing most inputs, such as,
say, sugar beets. If there is no legitimate justification, the inference is
78
strong that the cartel has market power.'
By contrast, if competitors who agree to impose maximum price
constraints on their dealers are unlikely to have market power in the
purchase of distributionservices, then perhaps some legitimate justification explains their arrangement. In Kiefer-Stewart, for instance, the
distillers were attempting to thwart a wholesalers' cartel.' 79 Of course,
the Supreme Court has said that competitors cannot successfully defend an agreement to restrict competition between themselves on the
ground that it prevents some unlawful conduct. 8 0 But the undeniable economic reality is that the arrangement can benefit consumers,
and prohibiting a restraint of trade that increases consumer welfare
on the ground that it might have the opposite effect in other circum177 One could reasonably argue that horizontal agreements to impose maximum
resale prices should be legal per se on the ground that few instances are likely to be
anticompetitive, and the savings in litigation costs attendant to a rule of no liability
would outweigh the efficiency loss associated with the anticompetitive occasions. See

infra notes 179-82 and accompanying text. We do not go that far, however, because
we believe that the reasonableness inquiry in this context is practical.
178 See, e.g., Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 339 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (observing that "the very existence of [a price fixing agreement) implies
power over price" in the market where it occurs).

179 A similar justification was offered for purely vertical maximum price fixing in
Kestenbaum v. FalstaffBrewing Corp., 575 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1978). The supplier allegedly attempted to constrain resale prices in order to prevent wholesalers from conspiratorially raising prices. The court held that monopoly profits lost by the
wholesalers were not antitrust damages.

180

See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 468 (1941).
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stances ignores the fundamental purpose of antitrust law.18 1 Indeed,
if distributors collude to fix price, the only means of self-help their
suppliers may have is to impose a resale price ceiling, for the suppliers
likely would have no antitrust standing to maintain an antitrust action
against them. 182 If horizontal agreements to impose maximum resale
prices can in theory have either positive or negative effects on consumer welfare, a rule of per se illegality might nevertheless be appropriate if instances of negative effects greatly predominate, and the
costs of distinguishing between the two are not worth the effort. Such
empirical support, however, is nonexistent. The law's experience is
limited to one reported case, and that was an example of consumer
benefit.
We suggest, then, that horizontal agreements to impose resale
price caps be subject to the rule of reason. Our suspicion is that few
instances of these arrangements, either beneficial or harmful, are deterred by the current per se rule, and so a change to the rule of reason
would likely have little effect. But we see no reason why courts could
not identify at reasonable cost any instances of anticompetitive use of
the practice. We readily acknowledge the frustrating vagueness that
typically attends use of the rule of reason. 183 In most cases of horizontal agreements to fix maximum resale prices, however, the rule would
entail a simple inquiry into whether the market for distribution services in the case at hand is so unusual that the upstream firms have
monopsony power. The justification for per se illegality, therefore, is
unconvincing.
Our analysis thus far has assumed that resources devoted to distribution are not specialized in an economically relevant sense. In the
long run, that will almost invariably be true. In the short run, however, distribution services indeed may be specialized to a particular
181

See RIcHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRusT LAW 209-10 (1976) (arguing that a boycott

intended solely to prevent unlawful conduct should not be an antitrust violation).
182 See Page, supra note 69, at 1492-93 (arguing that suppliers of a cartel suffer
antitrust injury but do not have antitrust standing to complain). Of course, suppliers
in such a case might unilaterally impose resale price caps on their own dealers without agreeing to the vertical restraint, thereby avoiding liability. But they would run
the risk that an agreement would be inferred from parallel conduct. See generally Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism
and Refusals to Deal 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962). And unilateral action could be
ineffective if the downstream cartel was economically able to cut off any individual
supplier that imposed a resale price cap. Nevertheless, the possibility that unilateral
imposition of a resale price ceiling could thwart a dealer's cartel reinforces the conclusion that Kiefer-Stewart did not involve a horizontal agreement in an economic
sense.
183 See generally infra notes 192-94 and accompanying text.
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industry or even an individual purchaser. One might then ask
whether maximum vertical price fixing should be condemned on the
ground that it may represent the exploitation of short-run monopsony
power. The answer is no, and the reason inheres in the difference
between monopsonistic exploitation and postcontractual opportunism.
In the monopsony model, no one is forced to provide services at
a price below his or her reservation level. Because of the monopsonistic pursuit of profit, the quantity of services is depressed below the
competitive level (Q0) and the corresponding price falls below the
competitive level (PI) to the monopsony level (P2). But these prices
are dictated by the supply curve, which shows the quantities of services
forthcoming at various prices. Each supplier receives at least her reservation price. There is no coercion here, in an economically meaningful sense.
Yet one might be concerned that the supplier may take advantage
of the dealer to the extent that the dealer incurs unrecoverable costs
to provide distribution services for this particular supplier. Suppose,
for example, that a franchisee like Khan has committed resources to
the specific venture. In the short run, Khan will continue in business
as long as the price he receives exceeds his average variable cost. If
the price is below his average total cost, he will experience losses, but
he will minimize these losses by continuing in business provided that
price exceeds average variable cost. Once committed, therefore,
Khan can be abused by State Oil if State Oil squeezes Khan's margins
enough to reduce price below average cost. In effect, Khan will earn a
return on his investment in gasoline retailing below the competitive
level. He will be a victim of postcontractual opportunism.
This kind of opportunism, however, is not an antitrust problem.
Dealers typically can protect themselves against it by contract. 8 4 If a
supplier breaches the contract, the dealer is entitled to contract reme184 Interestingly, Khan asserted a breach-of-contract claim along with his antitrust
claim. He argued that he had a contractual right to earn a normal return on his
investment by being allowed to maintain an appropriate margin between wholesale
and retail prices. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1366 (7th Cir. 1996), rev'd,
118 S. Ct. 275 (1997). Khan claimed that contract was breached when State Oil suggested retail prices (and set wholesale prices to provide a margin of 3.25 cents) that
were too high in light of competitive conditions. State Oil conceded its contractual
commitment, but the appellate court found insufficient evidence to support the
claim. See id. Of course, this claim had to do with the alleged inability to price below
a suggested floor, not to price above a suggested ceiling. But the principle applies
equally. Contract remedies can be obtained when a supplier breaches an obligation
to permit the dealer to earn an agreed-upon return by setting a resale price ceiling
too low.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 74:1

dies, and one might argue that no harm is done by holding the supplier liable for antitrust penalties to boot. But such a legal result
would be predictably inefficient so long as the remedy the plaintiff
can obtain exceeds the harm suffered. In that case, the dealer has a
perverse incentive to provoke the breach and to hold-up the supplier,
and the supplier has an incentive to invest in socially costly and unnecessary measures of self-protection. To the extent that the plaintiff
could obtain both contract and antitrust damages, the supplier's potential liability is obviously socially excessive. But of course, even antitrust sanctions alone as a remedy for the contractual breach would
likely be excessive, for unlike contract damages, antitrust damages are
trebled.
Further, dealers enjoy the protection afforded by inexorable market forces. If State Oil persisted in abusing its franchisees, they would
fail and no one would want to take their place. Unless State Oil wants
to integrate vertically and perform the distribution function itself, it
must make being a franchised lessee dealer financially attractive. Postcontractual exploitation is seldom if ever a viable long-run strategy,
and the antitrust laws ought to have no role to play unless a practice
threatens to inflict significant and sustained economic harm.
To be sure, the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image
Technical Services, Inc. 18 5 held that a seller can violate the antitrust laws
by exploiting the monopoly power that results from high switching
and information costs: once a purchaser is "locked-in" to a particular
piece of equipment, for example, the seller can demand a premium
for aftermarket products, such as repair parts and services, up to the
cost the purchaser would bear in switching to another brand of equipment if the purchaser cannot anticipate the full cost of the package of
products at the time she buys the equipment. Without in any way en1 8 6 it
dorsing an antitrust rule that addresses a contractual problem,
185 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (holding that the manufacturer of equipment can violate
the antitrust laws by denying unique repair parts to independent service providers,
thereby forcing equipment owners to procure repair service from the equipment
manufacturer, even when the firm has no market power in the sale of equipment).
186 For commentary critical of Kodak, see BORK, supra note 60, at 436-38; Roger
D. Blair & Jill H. B. Herndon, Restraints of Trade by Durable Good Purchasers,IlI REV.
INDEP. ORG. 339 (1996); Herbert Hovenkamp, Market Power in Aftermarkets: Antitrust
Policy and the Kodak Case, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1447 (1993); Michael S. Jacobs, Market
Power Through Imperfect Information: The StaggeringImplicationsof Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Image Technical Services and a Modest ProposalFor Limiting Them, 52 MD. L. REV. 336
(1993); Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust:Economic Analysis after Kodak, 3 Sup.
CT. ECON. REV. 43 (1994); John E. Lopatka, The Court's Economic Gibberish, LEGAL
TIMEs, July 27, 1992, at S34. For contrary views, see Severin Borenstein et al., The
Economics of Customer Lock-In and Market Power in Services, in THE SERVICE AND PRODUC-
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does not support outlawing vertical maximum price fixing. The return the dealer expects for performing distribution services is the very
heart of the transaction with her supplier. It does not concern some
aftermarket service that a party would supposedly neglect or be unable to take into account at the time of committing to a particular
vendor. The dealer has both a keen incentive and the ability to protect herself contractually from subsequent opportunism on the part of
the supplier.
V.

A.

IMPLICATiONS OF

AI-AAv

The Demise ofAlbrecht

Critical analysis tends to blur ajudicial decision's positive contributions. Lest they go unappreciated, let us emphasize what Khan accomplished. Foremost, the Court repudiated a bad rule, despite the
mounting pressure of stare decisis. The decision, moreover, is a testament to the value of academic scholarship. Years of scholarly criticism
influenced the judicial mind in this case, and the beneficiary is the
1 s7
economy.
Just what the measure of these benefits are, however, is difficult
to estimate. As we mentioned earlier, and as Justice O'Connor observed, suppliers and dealers surely found ways to accomplish the purposes of maximum resale price fixing without running afoul of
Albrecht."' Tellingly, however, Justice O'Connor cited no authority
for her observation, and though we can point to theoretical alternatives and even to a few instances in which an alternative was used in
practice,' 8 9 we have no sense of the number of times a device was used
Trary CHALLENGE (P. Harker ed., 1994); Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust Tie-In Analysis

After Kodak: Understanding the Role of Market Imperfections, 62 ANIRrusr LJ. 263

(1994); Robert H. Lande, Chicago Takes It on the Chin:Imperfect Information Could Play a
Crucial Role in the Post-Kodak World, 62 ANrrrRusT L. J. 193 (1993); Steven C. Salop,
Exclusionary Vertical Restraints Law: Has Economics Mattered?, 83 AM. EcoN. REv. 168

(1993).
187 Justice O'Connor not only cited a number of articles in the course of her opinion, but she noted that scholarly "criticism of [Albrecht's theoretical justifications for a
per se rule] abounds" and explicitly stated that the Court's analysis was informed in
part by "a considerable body of scholarship discussing the effects of vertical restraints." State Oil Co. v. Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275, 282 (1997). See also id. at 283 (noting
that the Court reached its conclusion after "reconsidering Albrecht's rationale and the
substantial criticism the decision has received"); id. at 285 (remarking that "Albrecht
has been widely criticized since its inception").
188 See id. at 283.
189 Theoretical alternatives are surveyed and some cases employing them are identified in Roger D. Blair & Amanda K. Esquibel, Maximum Resale Price Restraints in
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merely to circumvent Albrecht. Presumably, most times an alternative
was tried, it was not challenged, for the purpose of an alternative is to
avoid offending the law. Nor can we predict the marginal inefficiency
of the substitute practice, the true opportunity cost of the per se prohibition. Then, too, we know that some firms tried to engage in vertical maximum price fixing despite Albrecht and were punished for it,
and we can assume that some firms simply surrendered, abandoning
any attempt to achieve the purposes of the practice. Thus, the benefits of repealing the per se rule are difficult to gauge, but they are
undeniable.
B.

Antitrust Injury

Although these direct benefits of Khan are real, the most important contribution of the case may be indirect: Khan strengthened the
antitrust injury doctrine without even mentioning it. Had the Court
never issued its opinion in ARCO, lower courts might eventually have
galvanized around the proposition that Brunswick implicitly disallowed
private actions contesting vertical maximum price fixing. That would
have limited the enforcement of the Albrecht rule to the federal agencies, if that, and they likely would have been unenthusiastic
prosecutors.19 0
ARCO's message was clear, however. Dealers were constrained by
a price ceiling and consumers could sue, so the specter of an antitrust
injury doctrine cut loose from its economic mooring loomed. Lower
courts were free to fashion definitions of antitrust injury that encompassed harms flowing from a host of practices and having nothing to
do with consumer welfare. The antitrust injury doctrine serves to limit
the pernicious effects of misguided antitrust rules, for it circumscribes
the universe of potential enforcers. Additionally, it serves as a check
Franchising,65 ANTITRUST L. J. 157 (1996). Another example is Ryoko Manufacturing
Co. v. Eden Services, 823 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1987), where the supplier was able to

constrain the dealers' prices by creating an agency relationship with the dealers, such
that the supplier was not fixing maximum resale prices. In Greene v. General Foods
Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1975), the supplier attempted to pursue the same strat-

egy but failed. The court held that dealers were purchasers, not agents.
190 The Court observed that "Albrecht has little or no relevance to ongoing enforcement of the Sherman Act," and it noted that neither the parties nor amici could
identify any cases in which vertical maximum price fixing was attacked by government

enforcers. Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 283. Recall that in his opinion in Khan, Judge Posner
intimated that even the federal government might be precluded from challenging the
practice if it failed to inflict antitrust injury. See Kahn v. State Oil, 93 F.3d 1358, 1364
(7th Cir. 1996). We doubt that most federal appellate courts would have taken that

position, though.
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on erroneous application of sound rules in ambiguous settings, for it
can foreclose some plaintiffs from recovering when the court cannot
tell whether a practice actually causes an inefficiency. Whether the
doctrine could reliably perform these functions was put in doubt by
ARCO. By repudiating Albrecht, the Khan Court did away with a substantive doctrine that was irreconcilable with an efficiency-based concept of antitrust injury, and it severely undercut the suggestion in
ARCO that constrained dealers and consumers are perfectly viable
plaintiffs. 191 As we shall see, Khan does not completely eliminate the
strain that maximum vertical price fixing law places on the antitrust
injury rule. And, to the extent that other substantive doctrines are
inconsistent with the injury requirement, other sources of tension exist.192 Nevertheless, the antitrust injury doctrine rests more comfortably today because of Khan.
C. The Rule of Reason
We come to the primary weakness of Khan, which concerns the
rule the Court ostensibly adopted to replace Albrecht. The Court did
not hold that maximum vertical price fixing is legal per se, but rather
that it is to be judged under the rule of reason. Indeed, the Court
noted, "[W]e of course do not hold that all vertical maximum price
fixing is per se lawful. Instead, [the practice], like the majority of
commercial arrangements subject to the antitrust laws, should be evaluated under the rule of reason."1 9 3 Well, why is the practice "of
course" not legal per se? For that matter, just why are so few commercial arrangements per se legal? And how exactly can an instance of
vertical maximum price fixing fail the test of reasonableness?
Perhaps we take the Court too literally. After all, the major advance in Khan was the repudiation of Albrecht, and, if maximum verti191 Of course, the Court could easily have resolved ARCO by repudiating Albrecht
rather than by resorting to antitrust injury, and one wonders why the Court took
different approaches in ARCO and Khan. Possibly the Court's attitude toward maximum vertical price fixing changed over the seven years after it decided ARCO; the
composition of the Court certainly changed. In the interim, Justice Souter replaced
Justice Brennan; Justice Thomas replaced justice Marshall; Justice Ginsburg replaced
Justice White; and Justice Breyer replaced Justice Blackmun. See WILLAM CoHEN &
JONATHAN D. VARAT, CoNsTrrTToNAL LAW 1718 (10th ed. 1997). Or possibly the
Court wanted to refine the antitrust injury doctrine in 1990 and seized an opportunity
to do so; by 1997, it may have been more interested in the substantive doctrine.
192 For example, minimum vertical price fixing remains illegal per se even when it
increases consumer welfare. The substantive rule is in inescapable tension with the
requirement that a private plaintiff demonstrate an injury related to an inefficient
aspect of the practice.
193 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 285 (emphasis added).
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cal price fixing is proclaimed not to be illegal per se, what harm is
done by admitting the possibility that the practice may be unreasonable? Surely the qualification conduced toward a unanimous decision,
a nice attribute of an opinion. And if no future court in fact finds the
practice unreasonable, unanimity may seem to be purchased at zero
cost. Besides, maybe the Court did not really mean what it said.
Maybe the practice really is never to be condemned, despite the
Court's contrary assertion. But we take the Court at its word, and its
word does have costs, though again the magnitude of those costs is
uncertain.
One flaw in recognizing the possibility of unreasonableness is the
tension that it creates in the logic of the opinion. The Court made
quite clear that the anticompetitive effects attributed to vertical maximum price fixing in Albrecht and repeated in later cases do not withstand scrutiny. If those effects are illusory, the implication seems to be
that the practice never has the kind of effects necessary to deem it
unreasonable. True, one might argue that the Court has other possible anticompetitive effects in mind. But the Court offers no hint of
any, and recall that Judge Posner was unable even to imagine any
other effects.
Perhaps, though, we are too hasty in concluding that the Court
intended to reject the theoretical possibility of the Albrecht effects. We
think not. The concern that vertical maximum price fixing "could
interfere with dealer freedom" is a tautology, not an anticompetitive
effect. 194 The response to the claim that the manufacturer might set
the price cap too low for the dealer to provide optimal services seems
to be that the suggestion is implausible, not that it is impossible. Such
a decision would injure the manufacturer, and firms are assumed to
maximize profits. 195 But the response actually is more fundamental.
194 Id. at 282.
195 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Though the record is not entirely
clear, Khan probably is not a case where, for reasons of transaction costs, the supplier
refused to allow the dealer to provide additional services and raise price to a profitmaximizing level in an unusual local market. The dealership contract allowed Khan
to ask State Oil to raise the suggested resale price if he believed it to be too low, and
State Oil would either agree or not agree to an increase. See Khan, 93 F.3d at 1360.
The apparent inference is that the supplier contemplated treating at least Khan's
market individually. Perhaps the contract provision was illusory, and State Oil did not
in fact intend to negotiate separate suggested resale prices for its dealers, but we can
assume that State Oil was Willing to consider setting resale prices on the basis of individual locations. If that is so, alternative conclusions are possible. First, had State Oil
refused to raise its suggested price (in fact, the receiver apparently never requested a
price increase), its decision might have been a mistake. In that event, Khan could
have earned additional profits by exceeding the price cap and providing additional
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The market provides its own sanction for the manufacturer's mistake,
and the antitrust laws should not and generally do not provide a remedy when the market is quickly self-correcting, for antitrust intervention is predictably more costly. Similarly, if vertical maximum price
fixing channels distribution through "large or specially advantaged
dealers" to the detriment of more efficient dealers, the market will
sanction the manufacturer; if the disadvantaged dealers are equally or
19 6
less efficient, consumers either suffer no harm or enjoy a benefit.
Having explained why these three concerns are not antitrust concerns
at all, the Court's conclusion that they can be addressed under the
197
rule of reason makes little sense.
The one Albrecht effect that stands up in theory is that vertical
maximum price fixing may be minimum price fixing in disguise. Vertical minimum price fixing may be anticompetitive, for it can facilitate
supplier or dealer collusion, even if it is rarely used for this purpose.
The Court seemed most troubled by this potential effect,198 but concluded that it could be "recognized and punished under the rule of
reason."1 9 9 The problem of disguised resale price maintenance, however, is one of characterization, not one concerning the appropriate
rule for vertical maximum price fixing. Thus, the Court could hold
that vertical maximum price fixing is legal per se, but that, when it is
really minimum price fixing, it is illegal per se as a device that facilitates a cartel.
The judicial imagination is bounded, however. Perhaps actual,
vertical maximum price fixing can have anticompetitive effects in ways
that the Court, the litigants, and Judge Posner apparently could not
imagine.20 0 And so, retaining the rule of reason to govern this pracservices, but State Oil, too, would have lost profits. State Oil would have been penalized for its own mistake, and antitrust intervention would have been unnecessary.
Alternatively, additional profits that Khan could have earned might have represented
exploitation of his downstream monopoly power. Those profits would have come at
the expense of State Oil and consumers, and preventing the price increase would
have served the purposes of the antitrust laws.
196 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 283.
197 See id (noting that these "other concerns articulated in Albrecht can be appropriately recognized and punished under the rule of reason").
198 As to the other three concerns extracted from Albrecht, the Court repeated
scholarly criticisms; as to this concern, however, the Court did not. See id at 282-83.

199 Id. at 283.
200 As our economic analysis of the monopsony hypothesis demonstrates, a supplier could conceivably have monopsony power in the purchase of distribution services, and it could unilaterally exploit that power through vertical maximum price
fixing. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text. In such circumstances, the
practice is inefficient. We would argue that it should nevertheless be lawful because it
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tice may allow it to be appropriately outlawed in some surprising, future setting. That possibility requires us to consider just how the rule
of reason is to be applied. Courts now generally begin a full-blown
inquiry into reasonableness by asking whether the defendant has market power. 20 1 If it does not, the case ends; if it does, the practice is
subject to further review. As our economic analysis demonstrates, the
market power screen is useless in the context of maximum vertical
price fixing. The practice typically has no purpose unless the upstream firm has market power.
One can attempt to finesse this obstacle by interpreting the
screen to require substantialmarket power or power in an interbrand
market, 20 2 but the effort is misguided. First, the level of market power
deemed critically significant is impossible to capture in a standard,
and measuring market power according to some usable metric is usually impractical. For that matter, market power presupposes a properly defined market, and market definition is notoriously imprecise.
More importantly, the amount of market power is irrelevant to the
economic purpose and effects of the practice. The logic of the market power screen is that vertical maximum price fixing is more likely
to be anticompetitive as the upstream firm's market power rises above
some level. But the practice in fact is incapable of causing anticompetitive effects regardless of the amount of market power the firm has.
Indeed, the efficiency-enhancing effect of the practice becomes more
obvious the greater the firm's market power.
Focusing on interbrand market power is no more useful. In
Khan, for instance, the Court reconfirmed its "general view that the
primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect interbrand competition. ' 20 3 The distinction between interbrand and intrabrand compedis the counterpart to the perfectly lawful exploitation of monopoly power. If the supplier has not otherwise violated the antitrust laws in acquiring its monopsony position,
the implication is that the upstream firm provided an economic benefit to the downstream firms by creating a market for their services. By hypothesis, the upstream firm
would have no monopsony power if the dealers had alternative employment. Like the
monopolist, then, the monopsonist should be permitted to exploit its power in order
to create an incentive to create the dealership opportunity.
201 The Court has implied that a plaintiff must show that the defendants had market power in a case subject to full-blown rule of reason analysis. See FTC v. Indiana
Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff need not
prove the defendant's market power either when the challenged restraint of trade is
naked or when the plaintiff proves an actual anticompetitive effect); see also Posner,
supra note 23, at 16 (collecting cases).

202 For example, Posner describes the approach as requiring "substantial market
power in a relevant market." Posner, supra note 23, at 16.
203

Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 282.
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tion, first emphasized by the Court in Sylvania, has been interpreted
to imply that a distributional restraint passes the test of reasonableness
if it "stimulate[s] interbrand competition" more than it "reduces intrabrand competition. '20 4 In Sylvania, the distinction between interbrand and intrabrand competition made some sense, though we
would have articulated the point differently. Recall that the manufacturer in that case imposed location restrictions on its dealers, thereby
strengthening their territorial exclusivity in order to compete more
vigorously with other manufacturers of television sets. If competition
is viewed as a process for maximizing consumer welfare, then the territorial restraint did not restrict intrabrand "competition" at all. To be
sure, it limited rivalry among dealers in the same brand of appliance,
but it did so in a way that increased competition. A restraint either
increases consumer welfare or it does not; opposite effects are not
netted out. In essence, the term "competition" in the supposed balancing test is used in two different senses, so the test, despite its seductive simplicity, just cannot be applied. 20 5 Still, the Court properly was
more concerned with promoting competition across brands of television sets than in preserving rivalry among Sylvania's dealers. In the
classic successive monopoly case, however, there is neither interbrand
nor intrabrand competition to promote or to protect.
Consider the situation in Albrecht. The Globe-Democrat was the
only publisher of a morning newspaper in St. Louis. As a result, there
was no real interbrand competition-there were no other brands. Albrecht had an exclusive distribution territory and, therefore, was insulated from competition in the home delivery of the newspaper. Thus,
there was no intrabrand competition either. The purpose of a maximum resale price restraint is to take the place of competition. Because there are no other distributors to force the home delivered
price to the competitive level, the publisher prevents the distributor
from raising price above the competitive level. Thus, the purpose of
this price restraint has nothing to do with promoting interbrand or
intrabrand competition.
In Khan, the situation may have been a bit different, but the emphasis on interbrand competition is nonetheless misplaced. State Oil
does not have a monopoly in gasoline. To the extent that consumers
may have a preference for Union 76 brand gasoline, State Oil will
204 324 Liquor Corp. v.Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1987).
205 See Posner, supra note 23, at 8, 18-22 ("[T]he idea of balancing the (assumed
to be anticompetitive) effects of the restriction on intrabrand competition with the
(assumed to be procompetitive) effects of the restriction on interbrand competition... is infeasible and unsound.").
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enjoy some amount of market power. Given the presence of rivals
selling somewhat differentiated products that are relatively good substitutes for Union 76 gasoline, State Oil's imposition of maximum resale prices will promote interbrand competition. Of course, State
Oil's purpose is to earn more profit for itself, but in so doing State Oil
competes with other brands. The economic benefits of maximum vertical price fixing do not depend on whether it stimulates interbrand
competition.
Further, any utility that distinguishing interbrand from intrabrand competition might have was undercut by Kodak. There, the
Court was willing to hold that replacement parts and repair service for
Kodak equipment were relevant antitrust markets even though Kodak
equipment competes with other brands. Of course, the Court did not
hold that a brand always constitutes a relevant market, and the high
levels of switching and information costs that prompted the Court to
define the Kodak brand as a relevant market will not always be present. But the possibility will predictably induce litigants to claim that,
in their cases, the individual brands do define markets. Given that
information and switching costs are always positive and that the Court
gave little guidance on how high these costs must be to justify defining
a brand as a market, the claim that a brand is a market will rarely be
frivolous.
The possibility that plaintiffs will routinely assert that the defendant's brand is a market and that the vertical maximum price restriction therefore is somehow anticompetitive illustrates a fundamental
problem with subjecting maximum resale price fixing to the rule of
reason. It is not costless. As we have shown, the distinction between
interbrand and intrabrand competition is at best irrelevant, and the
search for "substantial" market power is similarly misguided. The
Court offers no other clue as to when an instance of maximum resale
price fixing will fail the reasonableness test. Yet, so long as the practice can be condemned, there is an incentive to challenge it, especially
by private parties who stand to recover treble damages. Conflict with
the antitrust injury doctrine knocks at the back door: if the Court
states clearly that maximum resale price fixing can violate the rule of
reason, then is it not likely that the Court means to imply that some
private plaintiffs suffer antitrust injury as a result of the practice? But
where is the anticompetitive harm? Perhaps the federal government
has not been an enthusiastic enforcer of Albrecht, but prosecutorial
attitudes can change. Leaving open the possibility that vertical maximum price fixing violates the rule of reason is mischievous, for it encourages costly legal challenges of a practice that does not have
anticompetitive effects.
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There is an alternative to both per se illegality and the rule of
reason, of course. It is per se legality, and given the lack of justification for applying any rule that condemns the practice, the alternative
is appealing. Yet as the Court noted, "the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the antitrust laws" should be evaluated under
the rule of reason.2 06 Interestingly, the Court does not tell us whether
any of the remaining practices in this universe of commercial arrangements are per se legal; they might all be per se illegal. Richard Posner
has called the rule of per se legality "that most rarely used of antitrust
techniques." 20 7 In fact, one is hard pressed to think of a single practice that the Court has declared to be per se legal, though per se legality is the implication of the Court's treatment of an arrangement or
two. For instance, a purely unilateral action within the confines of the
Colgate doctrine cannot violate the antitrust laws.2 08 The mystery is
why the Court is so reluctant to ascribe per se legality status to commercial arrangements. Just as an efficiency-enhancing instance of a
per se illegal practice is sacrificed for the benefits of a per se rule, one
could imagine tolerating an anticompetitive instance of a per se legal
practice for the same reason.20 9 This is not the place to explore in
depth the Court's hostility toward the rule of per.se legality. We note,
however, that maximum vertical price fixing is the likeliest candidate
we can imagine for per se legality treatment. The Court's insistence
that the practice remain subject to the rule of reason indicates that
the Court has no interest in declaring a commercial arrangement per
se legal anytime soon.
D. Impact on Other Antitrust Doctrines
Antitrust futurists will enjoy predicting the effect Khan will have
in areas beyond vertical maximum price fixing. We have already said
that the decision bodes ill for per se lawful treatment of any practice.
The most intriguing question, though, is whether the decision signals
the repudiation of the per se rule against vertical minimum price fixing in favor of the rule of reason. Those who foresee the demise of
Dr.Miles are not of one mind, of course. Some would applaud the
change; others would decry it. Indeed, our suspicion is that many who
206

Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 285.

207 Posner, supra note 23, at 23.
208 See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (holding that a supplier's unilateral actions to maintain resale prices cannot violate section 1 for lack of
an agreement even though vertical price agreements are illegal per se).
209 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 23, at 23 ("The same considerations of judicial
economy and legal certainty that justify use of per se rules of illegality in some cases
justify the use of rules of per se legality in others.").
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supported retention of the Albrecht rule took that stance not because
they feared the consequences of vertical maximum price fixing, but
because they feared that repudiation of Albrecht would lead to repudia2 10
tion of Dr. Miles.
In our opinion, the downfall of Dr. Miles is nowhere in sight,
though not because the per se rule against resale price maintenance is
decidedly more defensible than the per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing. Rather, our surmise is based on four related reasons. First, the proposition that consumers can benefit when a
supplier insists on higher retail prices continues to meet popular
resistance.2 1 1 Many are convinced that higher prices invariably make
consumers worse off, even though the package of product and service
is more desirable. Second, scholarly commentary is not nearly as consistent and overwhelming in opposition to Dr.Miles as it was in opposition to Albrecht. Recall that the Khan Court was admittedly influenced
by the weight of scholarship critical of the per se rule against vertical
maximum price fixing. Third, the legal inertia reflected in the doctrine of stare decisis was not as powerful in Khan as it would be if the
Court were to reconsider Dr.Miles. The Court in Khan paid tribute to
stare decisis, noting that it approached reconsideration of its decisions
"with the utmost caution. '21 2 But few cases at any level of the judiciary
had squarely presented the Albrecht rule, itself a relatively recent innovation, so the value in adhering to precedent was not great. By contrast, Dr. Miles has been around since 1911 and has been applied and
reaffirmed in a score of cases. The Supreme Court itself has refused
to repudiate the rule despite ready opportunities to do so. 213 Finally,
210 For example, amici in Khan argued that "[olverruling Albrecht will ripple far
beyond maximum vertical price fixing. It will call into question almost a century of
this Court's condemnation of all forms of price fixing .... " Brief of Thirty-Three
States and the Territory of Guam in Support of Respondents at 9, State Oil Co. v.
Khan, 118 S. Ct. 275 (1997) (No. 96-871). Our impression is that the form of price
fixing about which these amici were most concerned was resale price maintenance.
211 See, e.g., Baer Briefs New York Bar Group on Recent Enforcement Developments, 73
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., Dec. 4, 1997, at 528-29 (reporting comments of the

FTC's Bureau of Competition Director to the effect that a per se rule against minimum resale price maintenance, unlike one against maximum vertical price fixing, is
not "contrary to the purpose of bringing lower prices to consumers").
212 Khan, 118 S. Ct. at 284. Justice Breyer in particular has emphasized the importance of stare decisis to the rule of law. See Lopatka, supra note 60, at 18-19.
213 See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988) (avoiding
reconsideration of the Dr. Miles rule in a case involving alleged termination of a

dealer for price cutting); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
761-62 n.7 (1984) (declining the "opportunity to reconsider" whether resale price
maintenance agreements should be illegal per se); Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977) (distinguishing vertical price restraints from
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the Court would provoke a political maelstrom were it to repeal Dr.
Miles, whereas political interest in preserving Albrecht was not-nearly as
acute. A major feature of bills introduced to repeal Monsanto was the
codification of the per se rule against minimum vertical price fixing,
whereas they specifically exempted from the reach of the per se rule
214
agreements on maximum resale prices.
The Dr.Miles rule is not the only antitrust doctrine that could be
affected by Khan. The treatment of any vertical restraint now subject
to the rule of per se illegality might be reconsidered, and the other
likely suspect is tying arrangements.2 1 5 But even though tying is nominally subject to the per se rule, the rule as applied is tantamount to
reasonableness review.2 1 6 The Court is not likely to change the form

of tying analysis in the near future,2 1 7 and the substance of the analysis
would not change much if it did. Khan might also affect the antitrust
approach to certain horizontal arrangements. For example, we have
already argued that an agreement between competitors to impose
maximum resale prices, the kind of agreement thought to exist in
Kiefer-Stewart,should not be illegal per se but rather subject to the rule
218
of reason, though we are not optimistic that the Court will agree.
Another possibility is that the Court will reconsider per se treatment
vertical non-price restraints for purposes of repudiating the per se rule against only
the latter).
214 See, e.g., The Consumer Protection Against Price-Fixing Act of 1991, S. 429,
102nd Cong. § 3 (version 3, May 12, 1991) ("[T]he fact that the seller of a good or
service and the purchaser of a good or service entered into an agreement to set,
change, or maintain the resale price of a good or service shall be sufficient to constitute a violation ....
except that this section shall not apply when the agreement
[pertains to] the maximum resale price of a good or service. Such maximum resale
price agreements shall not be deemed illegal per se; such agreements shall be judged
on the basis of their reasonableness."); Price Fixing Prevention Act of 1991, H.R.
1470, 102nd Cong. § 2 (version 2, OcL 4, 1991) ("[T]he fact that the seller of a good
or service and the purchaser of such good or service entered into an agreement to set,
change, or maintain the price (other than a maximum price) of such good or service
for resale shall be sufficient to constitute a violation . . ").
215 A tying arrangement "may be defined as an agreement by a party to sell one
product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied)
product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other
supplier." Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
216 See generally Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984);
Lopatka, supranote 60, at 68-69 (observing that "the per se rule in tying cases mimics
a rule of reason").
217 In Jefferson Parish,a majority of the Court observed that "[i]t is far too late in
the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain
tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore
are unreasonable 'per se.'" Jefferson Parish,466 U.S. at 9.
218 See supra notes 177-83 and accompanying text.
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of horizontal agreements to fix maximum prices, as opposed to resale
prices. 21 9 That rule might change, but the change would have less to
do with Khan than with reconsideration of the teaching of Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. Columbia BroadcastingSys., Inc. 220 in the maximum price

fixing context.
If Khan has an effect on other antitrust doctrines, we believe that
its influence will be much more subtle than the possible effects just
described. In fact, if these subtle changes occur, they will probably
not be driven by Khan at all, but rather they and Khan will be driven
by the same underlying impulse. That impulse might be characterized as skepticism toward assertions of anticompetitive impact and
openness to explanations of the efficiency-enhancing capacity of restrictions, at least in the area of distributional restraints other than
resale price maintenance. The Court, then, may assess various distributional restraints under the rule of reason more sympathetically in
the future. We could imagine, for example, a more hospitable reac22 1
tion to exclusive dealing arrangements and requirements contracts.

This, however, is rank speculation on our part. Our best judgment is that the Khan Court meant to do exactly what it said it was
doing, no more and no less. Those who would claim that Khan
portends dramatic changes in antitrust dogma do so with little
support.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Khan significantly improved the state of antitrust law in two principal ways. First, it repudiated the rule that vertical maximum price
fixing is illegal per se. That rule was ill-conceived. It was inconsistent
with the purpose of antitrust law, and it prompted firms to adopt
costly substitute practices to achieve the function of maximum resale
price arrangements without violating the law. Second, Khan lessened
219 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (holding an
arrangement among physicians and insurers to set maximum prices for medical services illegal per se); see also Easterbrook, supra note 144 (arguing that the time has
come to abandon any per se rule against maximum price fixing).
220 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (holding that the efficiencies incident to blanket copyright
licensing meant that the arrangement was not illegal per se).
221 Exclusive dealing arrangements are agreements under which a dealer agrees to
distribute the supplier's products and not those of the supplier's competitors. They
are judged more or less harshly under the rule of reason. See Standard Oil Co. of Ca.
v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). Requirements contracts, which are economically equivalent, provide that the purchaser will buy its entire requirements of a product from the supplier and are also subject to the rule of
reason. See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961)
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the strain on the antitrust injury doctrine. The per se rule against
vertical maximum price fixing was fundamentally irreconcilable with
the antitrust injury requirement, and so the rule threatened to undermine the economic core of an important procedural doctrine.
Although Khan contributed significantly to sound antitrust policy, the decision is flawed. It replaced the rule of per se illegality, not
with a rule of per se legality, but with the rule of reason. In the context of maximum vertical price fixing, a test of reasonableness makes
little sense. The practice has no discernable anticompetitive consequences in any setting. Further, the content of the test is a mystery,
and therefore its application is unpredictable. Yet, admitting the possibility that the practice will be deemed unreasonable encourages
costly challenges and perpetuates a degree of conflict with the antitrust injury doctrine.
In the end, the Court did well. It could have done better.
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